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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), as this 
matter was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court from a final judgment of the Eighth 
District Court, and the appeal was transferred to this Court. The district courtfs ruling is 
at Addendum Exhibit A hereto. , 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue Presented 
Whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment dismissing Plain-
tiffs'/Appellants' claims for an interest in ten oil and gas leases in Uintah County under a 
joint venture theory, when Plaintiffs had already unsuccessfully pursued a claim against 
the same defendants for an interest in the same leases under a different theory. 
Standard of Review 
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Brockbank v. 
Brockbank, 2001 UT App 251, % 10, 32 P.3d 990. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Not applicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, The Prior Action: Third District Court. 
This case represents another episode in the Plaintiffs' continuing attempts to obtain 
an interest in ten federal oil and gas leases in the Book Cliffs area owned by defendants 
Del-Rio Resources, Inc3 and/or its wholly-owned subsidiary, Del-Rio Drilling Programs, 
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Inc. (collectively "Del-Rio").1 In July 2001, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the Third District 
Court against Del-Rio Resources and Dan Shaw, claiming an interest in those leases and 
seeking damages. (Third District Court Complaint, Addendum Exhibit B hereto, R. 289-
93.) The only basis given for Plaintiffs' rights was a May 1995 agreement between 
Plaintiffs and Defendants Shaw and Del-Rio Resources. (Id.) The claim against Del-Rio 
Resources was dismissed with prejudice on summary judgment, based on the court's 
ruling that the 1995 Agreement did not grant Plaintiffs any rights in the leases. (R. 278-
82.) That order was certified as final under Rule 54(b). (R. 278.) 
Plaintiffs subsequently appealed the decision dismissing their claims (R. 275-76) 
and sought leave to amend in the Third District Court action to claim an interest in the 
leases under a purported "joint venture partnership" theory (R. 262-70). In their motion 
for leave to amend, Plaintiffs admitted that they consciously chose not to raise the joint 
venture claim sooner, because "they thought their rights and interest were clear from the 
1995 Agreement." (R. 263.) The Third District Court denied the motion for leave to 
amend.2 (R. 248.) 
B. The Present Action: Eighth District Court. 
A few weeks later, on June 23, 2003, Plaintiffs filed an action in the Eighth Dis-
trict Court, once again claiming an interest in the same leases, this time under the joint 
venture theory. (Eighth District Court Complaint, Add. Ex. C, R. 2-9.) This action is the 
one now before the Court on this appeal. Contradicting the claims they made in the Third 
1
 Del-Rio Drilling Programs was dissolved in May 1990. 
2
 That ruling was appealed as well, but Plaintiffs subsequently dismissed that 
second appeal. 
District Court, Plaintiffs' Complaint in the Eighth District Court alleges that prior to 
1995, Plaintiffs and Del-Rio were members of a joint venture, and that Del-Riofs interests 
in the ten leases really belongs to the joint venture. (Id.) 
On June 4, 2004, Del-Rio moved for summary judgment, asserting that Plaintiffs' 
claims were barred by the claim preclusion branch of res judicata, because the present 
case involved the same plaintiffs attempting to obtain an interest in the same land from 
the same defendants. (R. 245-313.) Del-Rio noted that the claim in the present action, 
for an interest in the ten leases, was either the same as the claim in the Third District 
Court action or a claim that could have and should have been brought in the Third 
District Court; either way, res judicata barred the present claim. Del-Rio also pointed out 
Plaintiffs' admission in the Third District Court action that they had considered bringing 
the joint venture theory but consciously chose not to do so. 
In opposition, Plaintiffs admitted that the Eighth District Court action involved the 
same parties as the Third District Court, or their privies, and that the Third District Court 
action had resulted in a final judgment on the merits. (R. 328.) Plaintiffs contended, 
however, that the Eighth District Court action did not involve the same "claim," because 
the Third District Court action was based only on the 1995 Agreement, and the Eighth 
District Court action was based on allegations of the joint venture, which involved 
different facts and evidence. (R. 323-28.) Plaintiffs also insisted that res judicata did not 
apply because the Third District Court action was styled as a claim for "declaratory 
relief," while the present one was styled as a claim to "quiet title" and for "constructive 
trust." (R. 321-22.) 
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In its reply memorandum below, Del-Rio pointed out that under a 1999 ruling by 
this Court, American Estate Management v. International Investment & Development 
Corp., 1999 UT App 232, 986 P.2d 765, 767-68 (hereinafter "AEM"\ the claim 
preclusion branch of res judicata clearly barred a subsequent action asserting an interest 
in the same real property. (R. 340-48.) Del-Rio explained that in AEM, this Court 
unequivocally held that if a plaintiff unsuccessfully sues for an interest in real property, 
that plaintiff may not bring a successive action based on a theory that was also available 
to the plaintiff when the first action was filed, even if the second theory depends on 
different facts or evidence. Del-Rio also explained that Plaintiffs1 choice to call their 
initial action one for declaratory relief did not affect the res judicata effect of the 
dismissal of that action, because, among other things, a declaratory judgment action 
relating to real property interests is indistinguishable from a quiet title action. 
The trial court (Hon. John R. Anderson) granted Del-Rio's motion for summary 
judgment. (Ruling, Add. Ex. A, R. 353-54.) The trial court adopted the reasoning set 
forth in AEM: 
Although plaintiffs have attempted to raise a new and independent 
cause of action from the preceding action filed in the Third District Court, 
plaintiffs9 prior and present actions assert essentially only one claim - the 
final determination of rights in the 10 leases. As such, the present claims 
are subject to claim preclusion as they are res judicata. Plaintiffs[] con-
sciously chose not to raise the theory of breach of the joint venture 
partnership in the present [sic] action, even though the issue was ripe 
when plaintiffsQ filed the action in the Third District Court As a result, 
plaintiffs[] cannot attempt to relitigate the same claim simply based upon 
a new legal theory of liability. 
(Id. (emphasis added).) This appeal followed. 
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C. The Appeal of the Third District Court Action. 
Plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment ruling in the Third District Court. In a 
published opinion dated February 25, 2005, this Court vacated the summary judgment 
and ordered the matter remanded for further proceedings, directing the trial court to 
consider and rule on a Rule 56(f) affidavit that the Plaintiffs had filed in opposition to the 
summary judgment motion. See Energy Management Services v. Shaw, 2005 UT App 
90, f 14, 110 P.3d 158. The Court did not address the merits of the trial court's sub-
stantive ruling that the 1995 Agreement granted Plaintiffs no rights in the leases. Id. 
D. Undisputed Material Facts. 
To aid in the Court's assessment of this appeal, and to demonstrate how and why 
the trial court correctly ruled that Del-Rio is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that 
the claim preclusion branch of res judicata bars the present action, Del-Rio restates some 
of the undisputed material facts: 
1. In this action, Plaintiffs claim an interest in ten leases of federal land for oil 
and gas exploration and development on land in the Book Cliffs area of central Utah. 
(See, e.g.. Complaint, Add. Ex. C, ffl[ 49-57, R. 2-3.) 
2. In the Third District Court Action, Plaintiffs claimed an interest in the same 
leases. (See, e.g.. Third District Court Complaint, Add. Ex. B, 119, R. 291.) 
-5-
3. The Plaintiffs in this action are Jay Kirk, Steven Martens, Syndicators, Inc., 
and Western United Mines, Inc.3 (Add. Ex. C, R. 9.) 
4. The Plaintiffs in the Third District Court action were Jay Kirk, Steven 
Martens, Syndicators, Inc., and Western United Mines, Inc. (Add. Ex. B, R. 293.) 
5. Defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc., and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Del-
Rio Drilling Programs, Inc., are defendants in the present action. (Add. Ex. C, R. 9.) 
6. Defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc., was a defendant in the Third District 
Court action. (Add. Ex. B,R. 293.) 
7. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs ask for (i) a determination of the "interests of 
the parties in the subject property"; (ii) a constructive trust on the property in favor of the 
Plaintiffs; and (iii) damages for the Defendants' alleged failure to recognize Plaintiffs' 
interests in the subject leases. (Add. Ex. C, fflf 54, 57, 58, R. 2-3.) 
8. In the complaint in the Third District Court action, Plaintiffs asked for (i) a 
declaration of a "beneficial interest in the 10 federal oil and gas leases"; and (ii) damages 
for the Defendants' alleged failure to recognize Plaintiffs' interests in the subject leases. 
(Add. Ex. B, R. 289.) 
9. In the present action, Plaintiffs claim to be entitled to an interest in the ten 
leases by virtue of their participation in the alleged "joint venture partnership." (Add. Ex. 
C,1f49,R.3.) 
3
 On information and belief, Kirk is an officer or director of Syndicators; Martens 
is an officer or director of Western. However, both Kirk and Martens were officers and 
directors of Del Rio Resources until 1995. (R. 311.) 
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10. In the Third District Court Action, Plaintiffs claimed to be entitled to an 
interest in the leases under an agreement reached in May 1995 (the "1995 Agreement"). 
(Add. Ex. B, 1H 19, 26-27, 32, R. 290-91.) 
11. In November 2002, the Third District Court (Judge Livingston) entered an 
order granting summary judgment in Del-Rio's favor, dismissing all claims against Del-
Rio, but granted Appellants leave to file an amended complaint to state a new claim 
against co-defendant Dan Shaw. The Third District Court certified the judgment as final 
under Rule 54(b). (Order and Summary Judgment, Add. Ex. D, R. 278-82.) 
12. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed the Third District Court Order. (R. 275-
76.) 
13. Plaintiffs also moved the Third District Court for leave to amend, 
attempting to add a claim against Del-Rio for a "declaration of [Plaintiffs1] actual inter-
est" in the leases and settlement proceeds, claiming that Plaintiffs had a right to an 
interest in the leases as members of a joint venture with Del-Rio. (Third District 
Proposed Amended Complaint, Add. Ex. E, fflf 23-25, R. 267.) 
14. In the memorandum supporting their motion for leave to amend, Plaintiffs 
asserted that they "did not think it was necessary" to raise their joint venture claim 
sooner, because "they thought their rights and interest were clear from the 1995 Agree-
ment." (Third District Court Memorandum (Leave to Amend), Add. Ex. F, at 2, R. 263.) 
15. In the reply memorandum supporting their motion for leave to amend, 
Plaintiffs reiterated their position and stated as follows: 
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In reality, the amendment of plaintiffs1 claim against Del-Rio was 
necessitated by the Court's ruling on defendants1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Plaintiffs thought that the 1995 Agreement clearly established 
their rights in the 10 oil and gas leases that are and have been the subject 
of this action. There would have been no need for the amendment if the 
unambiguous provisions of the Agreement had been enforced. 
(Third District Court Reply Memorandum (Leave to Amend), Add. Ex. G, at 2, R. 259 
(emphasis added).) 
16. The Third District Court denied Plaintiffs1 motion for leave to amend in the 
prior action. (R. 248.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Eighth District Court's ruling should be affirmed, as the claim preclusion 
branch of res judicata clearly bars Plaintiffs1 second bite at the same apple, i.e., Plaintiffs1 
second lawsuit seeking to obtain an interest in the ten leases. The Third District Court 
action clearly involved the same parties as the present action, and ended in a final judg-
ment on the merits. And the claims brought in the present case, i.e., that Plaintiffs have a 
right to the leases through their participation in an alleged joint venture, clearly should 
have been brought in the prior lawsuit. 
Indeed, it has long been recognized that where real property interests are at stake, 
the demands of res judicata are at their strongest. Accordingly, in AEM, this Court held 
that a party may not bring successive actions to obtain an interest in the same real pro-
perty where the second action is based on grounds that existed when the first action was 
filed. Otherwise, res judicata would be meaningless. AEM followed earlier on-point 
Utah Supreme Court authority, as well as cases from several other jurisdictions. AEM, 
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which Plaintiffs do not even cite in their brief, is controlling, notwithstanding any dicta 
from Macris. 
Moreover, that Plaintiffs typed the words "declaratory relief* instead of "quiet 
title" on their complaint in the Third District Court does not affect the operation of res 
judicata. The case law makes clear that there is no difference between an action for a 
"declaration" of interests in real property and an action to quiet title, and that if a quiet 
title action is cast in declaratory form, it has the same preclusive effects as any other quiet 
title action. 
This case involves the same plaintiffs as the Third District Court action, suing the 
same defendants for an interest in the same property, based on grounds that "existed" (if 
they existed at all) when the first action was filed. Res judicata clearly applies here. The 
trial court's ruling should therefore be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIM FOR 
AN INTEREST IN THE OIL CANYON LEASES WAS BARRED BY THE THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S PRIOR CLAIM FOR AN 
INTEREST IN THOSE LEASES. 
The trial court correctly ruled that the "claim preclusion" branch of res judicata 
barred, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs1 claims in the Eighth District Court action. In the 
first action, Plaintiffs asked the Third District Court to award Plaintiffs an interest in the 
ten leases. That claim was dismissed with prejudice, and a final judgment was entered. 
In the second action, the Plaintiffs asked the Eighth District Court to award them an 
interest in the same leases. The only difference between this action and the prior one is 
-9-
that the Plaintiffs pursued a new legal theory - a theory Plaintiffs admit they considered 
and rejected in the prior action. 
The doctrine of claim preclusion provides that when a plaintiff pursues a claim 
against a defendant, and that claim is litigated to a conclusion, the plaintiff may not raise 
that claim, or a closely related claim, in a new action against the same defendant. Thus, 
the doctrine "precludes the relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated as well 
as those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior action." Macris & Assocs. v. Newavs. 
Inc., 2000 UT 93, 119, 16 P.3d 1214, 1219 (emphasis added) (citations and internal 
punctuation omitted). A subsequent claim will be barred if (1) both cases involve the 
same parties or their privies; (2) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits; 
and (3) the claim either (a) was presented in the first suit, or (b) could have and should 
have been presented in the first suit. Id. All elements are satisfied here. 
A. The prior action involved the same parties as the present action. 
First, the claims in prior action involved the same parties as the claims in the 
present action, or their privies. The plaintiffs in the prior action were Western United 
Mines, Inc., Syndicators, Inc., J.R. Kirk, Jr., and Steven D. Martens. The plaintiffs in the 
present action are Western United Mines, Inc., Syndicators, Inc., J. Rex Kirk, Jr., and 
Steven D. Martens. The prior claim was brought against Del-Rio Resources, Inc. The 
present claim is brought against Del-Rio Resources, Inc., and its wholly owned 
subsidiary, Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc.4 Indeed, Plaintiffs have conceded that the 
4
 Del-Rio Drilling Programs was in privity with Del-Rio Resources because Plain-
tiffs have treated them as having the same relationship to the subject matter of the litiga-
-10- i 
"same parties" element is satisfied. (See Appellants' Br. at 8 ("Although Plaintiffs 
conceded the existence of the first two factors in this case ....").) 
B. The prior action resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Similarly, the first action resulted in a final judgment on the merits. On November 
14, 2002, the Third District Court (Judge Livingston) entered an order granting Del-Rio's 
summary judgment motion and certifying the order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). A 
judgment certified as final under Rule 54(b) is just like any other final judgment. See, 
e.g., 10 Wright, Miller & Kane Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 2661 (1998) 
(noting that Rule 54(b) judgments have the same effect as other final judgments regar-
ding appeal time, issue preclusion and collateral estoppel, judgment liens and enforce-
ment procedures, and accrual of postjudgment interest). 
It is true that, as of the time this brief is being written, the Third District Court 
judgment has been vacated. However, in ruling on the appeal, the Court of Appeals did 
not hold that the Third District Court ruling was substantively erroneous. Rather, this 
Court merely held that because the district court had not addressed a pending Rule 56(f) 
motion on the record, the matter had to be remanded for the district court to address that 
motion. See Energy Management Services v. Shaw, 2005 UT App 90, ^ f 14, 110 P.3d at 
161-62. The Court expressly did not address the merits of the district court's ruling on 
tion, i.e., they have treated both as owners of the ten leases, without distinguishing 
between them. See Press Publishing v. Matol Botanical Intl., 2001 UT 106, ffif 20-22, 37 
P.3d 1121, 1128. Indeed, Del-Rio Drilling Programs was dissolved over ten years ago. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have agreed that the Third District Court judgment has the same 
preclusive effect on the claims against Del-Rio Drilling Programs that it does on the 
claims against Del-Rio Resources. 
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summary judgment. Thus, the district court's ruling that the Plaintiffs1 claim to the leases 
fails as a matter of law remains intact. 
Further, the remittitur matter was only recently issued (May 5, 2005). Del-Rio 
anticipates that the proceedings on the Rule 56(f) affidavit will be completed, and the 
Third District Court judgment reinstated, well before the proceedings on this appeal are 
completed. 
C. The claim in the Eighth District Court action was either the same claim as in 
the Third District Court or was a claim that could have and should have been 
brought in the Third District Court action. 
1. That Plaintiffs are pursuing a different legal theory in the Eighth 
District Court action does not mean that the actions involve "dif-
ferent claims" for res judicata purposes. 
The claims in the present action are claims that were pursued in the Third District 
Court, or at the very least are claims that should have been pursued in the prior action. 
Plaintiffs ask for the same relief in this action (a determination that they have interests in 
the leases, or alternatively, damages) that they sought in the prior action. The only dif-
ference between the two actions is that in the prior action, the Plaintiffs based their claims 
on the 1995 Agreement, while the present action is based on an alleged joint venture. In 
other words, the present action is identical to the prior one, except that the Plaintiffs are 
pursuing a new (and contradictory) legal theory. The law is clear, however, that coming 
up with a new legal theory does not create a new "claim" for res judicata purposes. See, 
e.g., AER 1999 UT App 232,111, 986 P.2d at 767-68. 
-12-
i 
a. The law is clear that a plaintiff may not pursue succes-
sive actions seeking an interest in the same real pro-
perty. 
Ultimately, however, the Court need not decide whether the claim presented in the 
present action is technically "different" from the claim presented in the Third District 
Court action, because even if the claims are different, the claim in the present action 
clearly could have and should have been raised in the first action. See id. f 12, 986 P.2d 
at 768 (emphasis added).) Claim preclusion serves "vital public interests," including 
(1) fostering reliance on prior adjudications; (2) preventing inconsistent 
decisions; (3) relieving parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits; 
and (4) conserving judicial resources. The "doctrine of res judicata is not a 
mere matter of practice or procedure inherited from a more technical time 
than ours. It is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice, fof public 
policy and of private peace,1 which should be cordially regarded and 
enforced by the courts...." 
State Office of Recovery Services v. V.G.P.. 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(citations omitted). 
These policy concerns are particularly important in real property disputes. As the 
United States Supreme Court declared in 1865, "Where questions arise which affect titles 
to land it is of great importance to the public that when they are once decided they should 
no longer be considered open. Such decisions become rules of property, and many titles 
may by injuriously affected by their change." Minnesota Co. v. National Co., 70 U.S. 
332, 3 Wall. 332 (1865 term) (emphasis added). See also Nevada v. United States. 463 
U.S. 110, 129 n.10, 103 S. Ct. 2906, 2918 n.10 (1983) (emphasis added) ("The policies 
advanced by the doctrine of res judicata perhaps are at their zenith in cases concerning 
real property, land and water"). Accordingly, case law from this Court, the Utah 
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Supreme Court, and elsewhere establishes that if a plaintiff is seeking an interest in real 
property, the plaintiff must raise all claims that are then available to him or her, and that 
if the plaintiffs first action fails, the plaintiff may not pursue a successive action based on 
other theories, even if those theories are based on different facts or evidence. 
AEM is the most significant case for our purposes, and one that is fatal to Plain-
tiffs1 claim.5 AEM, 1999 UT App 232, 946 P.2d 765. (A copy of AEM is attached as 
Addendum Exhibit H hereto.) In AEM, the plaintiff had acquired an apartment building 
from the defendants. The plaintiff sued, seeking damages and specific performance for 
an alleged breach of an agreement to convey title to an adjoining lot. Id. f 4, 986 P.2d at 
766. After that suit was dismissed on summary judgment, the plaintiff filed another 
action, this time claiming title to the same lot through adverse possession. Id. f 5. The 
trial court held that the second lawsuit was barred by res judicata, and this Court 
affirmed. 
The plaintiff in AEM made the same argument as the plaintiffs in the present 
appeal: That the adverse possession action involved a different "claim" from the one in 
the initial lawsuit, because the adverse possession claim "did not arise out of the 
5
 Indeed, it is surprising, and disappointing, that Plaintiffs1 brief does not even cite 
AEM. (See, e.g.. Appellants1 Br. at iii-iv (Table of Authorities).) Plaintiffs were obvi-
ously aware of AEM, as Del-Rio quoted AEM extensively in the trial court pleadings and 
even included a copy of AEM as an exhibit to Del-Rio's reply memorandum. (See R. 
332-37 (copy of AEM).) Presumably, Plaintiffs plan to present some reason why AEM is 
distinguishable or otherwise should not be followed in this case. But by waiting until 
their reply brief to even mention AEM, Plaintiffs have unfairly ensured that Del-Rio has 
no opportunity to respond to any such arguments. Del-Rio respectfully asks the Court to 
take this into consideration in weighing anything Plaintiffs say about AEM in their reply 
brief. 
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Separation Agreement, the transaction out of which the prior breach of contract claim 
arose, and [] proof of the adverse possession claim requires presentation of different facts 
and evidence." Id. f 8, 986 P.2d at 767. The plaintiff also asserted that res judicata did 
not apply because the plaintiff was unaware of its adverse possession claim when it filed 
the first lawsuit. Id. This Court squarely rejected both arguments. 
First, the Court expressly rejected the plaintiffs argument that merely because 
different facts or evidence were involved, the adverse possession action necessarily 
involved a separate "claim." The Court noted that because the case dealt with ownership 
of real property, it was especially important for all legal theories affecting that ownership 
to be brought in one action: 
Defining the scope of a claim or cause of action is not an exact science and, 
in fact, is at times driven by the relative importance of the finality of the 
judgment. [Citations omitted.] When, as in this case, title to real property 
is at issue, the need for finality is at its apex. See Farrell v. Brown, [], 729 
P.2d 1090, 1093 ([Idaho] Ct. App. 1986); 18 Charles Alan Wright, et al., 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 4408, at 65 (1981). 
Id. TJ10, 986 P.2d at 767 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the court concluded that 
"[c]ontrary to AEM's characterization, both its prior and present actions assert one claim -
- a claim of title to the parking lot parcel — albeit under two different legal theories. 
Other jurisdictions have so ruled, and have held subsequent suits barred." Id. f 11, 986 
P.2d at 767-68 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
The Court went on to explain that it did not even matter whether the second case 
technically involved the same claim as the first, "because we readily conclude that AEM 
could have and should have brought its adverse possession claim in the prior suit" Id 
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f 12 (emphasis added). The court cited the important policy considerations requiring that 
all claims and all theories be brought together: 
Claim preclusion reflects the expectation that parties who are given the 
capacity to present their entire controversies shall in fact do so. Ring-
wood, 786 P.2d at 1357 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 
cmt a. (1982)). If a party fails, purposely or negligently, to make good his 
cause of action, by all proper means within his control, he will not 
afterward be permitted to deny the correctness of that determination, nor to 
relitigate the same matters between the same parties. 
When [AEM] filed its complaint in the prior action in 1990, it had 
possessed the parking lot for the requisite seven years. Hence, its adverse 
possession claim was then ripe. AEM had a second chance to raise a claim 
of adverse possession when it amended its complaint in 1995, but did not. 
As in Rimwood, the only reason AEM's claim of adverse possession was 
not decided in the prior action was because AEM failed to raise it. And, 
as in Rimwood, the claim preclusion branch of res judicata bars AEM 
from doing so now. 
Id. fflf 12-14, 986 P.2d at 768-69 (some citations and internal punctuation omitted, 
emphasis added). 
AEM's reasoning fits the present case exactly. As in AEM, title and ownership of 
real property is at issue, and the "need for finality is at its apex." In fact, the need for 
finality is even more critical in the present situation, as Plaintiffs' relentless litigation has 
been preventing development of the leases. As in AEM, Plaintiffs' purported claim to the 
leases through their participation in the alleged joint venture was ripe when the first 
lawsuit was filed, and there was absolutely no reason why that theory could not have 
been raised in the first action. 
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Plaintiffs devote a good deal of space in their brief to explaining that the only 
theory they actually pursued in the Third District Court action was the claim under the 
1995 Agreement. (See Appellants' Br. at 8-14.) But that argument misses the point. 
Under AEM, it does not matter whether Plaintiffs actually raised the joint venture theory 
in the Third District Court action. Rather, what matters is whether Plaintiffs "could have 
and should have1' raised that theory in the Third District Court. Because the joint venture 
claim was ripe when the Third District Court action was commenced (or as ripe as a 
meritless claim can be), Plaintiffs clearly could have raised that theory in the Third 
District Court. And as established by AEM, Plaintiffs clearly should have raised that 
theory. Indeed, just as in AEM, "the only reason [Plaintiffs1] claim of [joint venture] was 
not decided in the prior action was because [Plaintiffs] failed to raise it." Id. f 14, 986 
P.2d at 768. Plaintiffs cannot rely on their own deliberate failure to pursue the joint 
venture theory as an excuse to avoid the operation of res judicata. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held that res judicata prevents a party from pur-
suing successive claims to the same real property under different legal theories based on 
different facts. See Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 45, 376 P.2d 946 (1962) (cited in 
AEM % 14, 986 P.2d at 768). In Wheadon, the plaintiff sought a right of way over the 
defendants' adjoining land and asserted a prescriptive easement. Summary judgment was 
granted for the defendants because the adverse use had not existed for the requisite 
twenty years. The plaintiff therefore filed a second action, asserting an implied easement, 
and that action was dismissed on res judicata grounds. The Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed: 
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We believe that the above-quoted statement supports the ruling of 
the lower court. Here, we have the same parties litigating the same 
subject matter — an asserted right of way over defendants9 property. 
While plaintiffs endeavored to establish this right of way by prescriptive 
easement in the first action, the issue or theory of implied easement, now 
urged in this second action, could have been urged and adjudicated in the 
first action. This is particularly true under our Rules of Civil Procedure 
which expressly permits two or more statements of a claim. 
Policy would seem to indicate that when a plaintiff has once 
attempted to obtain his entire relief, based upon his entire claim, then the 
matter should be laid at rest. He should be denied a second attempt at 
substantially the same objective under a different guise. 
Id, 14 Utah 2d at 47, 376 P.2d at 947-48 (emphasis added). 
Wheadon is still good law and therefore binding on the Court. Moreover, under 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993), this Court's holding in AEM is bin-
ding as well. Further, the AEM court cited at least eight out-of-state cases holding that a 
party seeking to obtain an interest in property must pursue all claims and theories in that 
action, and may not raise a new theory in a subsequent action after the first action turns 
out unsuccessful.6 Finally, as noted above, the United States Supreme Court, in 
6
 See AEM f 11 (citing Blance v. Alley. 697 A.2d 828, 830-31 (Me. 1997) 
(adverse possession claim barred by judgments in two prior actions to establish title to 
same property under other theories); Hyman v. Hillelson, 434 N.Y.S.2d 742, 745 (App. 
Div. 1980) (adverse possession action not separate from prior reformation suit where 
both involved conveyance of adjoining lots); Myers v. Thomas, No. 01A01-9111-CH-
00412, 1992 WL 56993, at *4, 1992 Term. App. Lexis 260, at *9-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
Mar. 25, 1992) (addition of adverse possession claim insufficient to distinguish later suit 
from prior suit involving same property); Green v. Parrack, 974 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1998) (prior judgment establishing ownership to strip of land precluded sub-
sequent competing claims to same strip under different theories)); AEM % 14 (citing 
Irving Pulp & Paper v. Kelly, 654 A.2d 416, 418 (Me. 1995) (plaintiff or privies pre-
cluded from having or claiming right or title by adverse possession that could have been 
brought in earlier adverse possession action); Bagley v. Moxley, 555 N.E.2d 229, 232 
(Mass. 1990) (plaintiff barred from pursuing claim of ownership through "piecemeal 
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upholding the dismissal of a water adjudication case on res judicata, has also affirmed 
that ff[t]he policies advanced by the doctrine of res judicata perhaps are at their zenith in 
cases concerning real property, land and water." Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 
129 n.10, 103 S. Ct. 2906, 2918 n.10 (1983). The trial courtfs ruling in the present action 
was clearly supported by the law. 
b. Maoris does not compel a different result. 
In light of the sheer weight of this authority, Plaintiffs1 reliance on dicta from 
Macris & Associates v. Newavs, 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214, is misplaced. In Macris, the 
plaintiff sued the defendant for wrongfully suspending and terminating a distributorship 
agreement. While that lawsuit was pending, the defendant transferred its assets to a 
newly formed corporation. Id. f 5, 16 P.3d at 1216. The plaintiff filed a separate action 
against the new company for fraudulent transfer and successor/alter ego liability. Id. f 7, 
16 P.2d at 1216-17. In the second action, the new company moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that the resolution of the first action barred the second action. Id. f 9, 
16 P.2d at 1217. On certiorari review, the Utah Supreme Court held that because those 
claims arose after the first lawsuit had been filed, claim preclusion, as a matter of law, 
could not apply. See icL 1Hf 20-27, 16 P.3d at 1219-20. The court went on to conclude 
that f,[m]oreover,ff claim preclusion did not apply because the claims in the two actions 
litigation, offering one legal theory to the court while holding others in reserve")); AEM 
114 n.3 (citing West Mich. Park Ass'n v. Fogg, 404 N.W.2d 644, 648 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1987) (plaintiff barred from making claim for adverse possession that could have been 
made in prior action); Hangman v. Bruening, 530 N.W.2d 247, 249 (Neb. 1995) (barring 
claim of adverse possession that could have been brought in earlier quiet title action)). 
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were different, as they relied on different facts and evidence. Id. f^ j 28-31, 16 P.3d at 
1221. 
First, the "different facts and evidence" discussion in Macris is not binding, be-
cause it is dicta. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the Macris court ruled that claim 
preclusion, as a matter of law, could not apply to the subsequent action, because the sub-
sequent action was based on events that happened after the initial complaint was filed. 
See Macris ffif 20-27, 16 P.3d at 1219-20. Thus, the outcome of the case, i.e., affirmance 
of the Court of Appeals' ruling that claim preclusion did not apply, would have been the 
same had the court ruled the other way on the "different facts" issue, or even if the court had 
not addressed that issue at all. Under any of these scenarios, the claim preclusion portion of 
the Court of Appeals ruling would have been affirmed. Therefore, because the court's 
discussion of the "different facts" issue was unnecessary to the outcome or holding of the 
case, that discussion is dicta and is not binding on the court in the present case.7 
Second, the discussion in Macris is not applicable to the present case, because 
Macris did not involve successive real property claims, or other "status" claims, based on 
7
 See, e.g. Koske v. Townsend Eng'g, 551 N.E.2d 437, 443 (Ind. 1990) (statements in 
prior case were obiter dicta, because such language was not necessary to determination of 
issues presented: "[the statements] are not binding and do not become law"); Creach v. 
Angulo, 925 P.2d 689, 692-693 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (language from prior case was non-
binding dicta, because the question was not necessary to resolving issue before the court in 
prior case); Shepherd Fleets, Inc. v. Oprvland USA, Inc., 759 S.W.2d 914, 921-22 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1988) ("Court decisions must be read with special reference to the questions 
involved and necessary to be decided, and language used which is not decisive of the case 
or decided therein is not binding as precedent"); People v. Heflin, 456 N.W.2d 10, 17 n.13 
(Mich. 1990) (stating obiter dictum does not constitute binding precedent); 5 Am. Jur. 2d 
Appellate Review § 603 (1995) ("[Statements in state appellate opinions which are not 
necessary in the determination of the issues presented are obiter dictum; they are not 
binding and do not become law."). 
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legal theories and facts that existed when the first action was commenced. Rather, both 
actions in Macris involved claims to contract damages, and the second claim arose out of 
actions that took place after the first lawsuit was filed. Indeed, because the claims in the 
second action did not even exist when the first action commenced, the court in Macris did 
not even address the "could and should have been brought" prong of claim preclusion. 
As such, Macris has no bearing on that issue, which was addressed squarely in AEM, 
Wheadon, and the other cases. 
It makes perfect sense that the case law treats basic damages claims differently 
from real property claims for res judicata purposes. A damages claim involves obtaining 
a remedy for past conduct. When two claims are based on different actions, taking place 
over different periods of time, it makes sense to allow two separate lawsuits. But a claim 
to determine ownership of land focuses on the present and the future: The purpose of the 
action is not to remedy something that happened in the past, but rather to decide, once 
and for all, who owns the property now and therefore has the right to control the property 
in the future. An important feature of such a status determination is the finality of the 
determination, and to ensure the finality of the determination made in such an action, it is 
important that the party bringing the action raise and litigate all reasons why he or she 
asserts an interest in that property. 
Thus, a case like Macris, which does not involve successive claims to real pro-
perty, is not binding authority on whether it is permissible to bring successive claims to 
real property, especially in light of the long-standing authority that bars such successive 
claims. Del-Rio respectfully submits that if the Utah Supreme Court had intended in 
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Macris to overrule Wheadon, AEM, and common law principles dating back to the Civil 
War, the court would have said so. Instead, the Macris court was clearly addressing only 
the case in front of the court at the time, and as such dicta from Macris has no bearing on 
this case.8 
Finally, it is highly significant that Plaintiffs expressly admitted in the prior action 
that they considered pursuing the joint venture theory and consciously chose not to do so. 
Plaintiffs' failure to bring such a claim, even though the claim was supposedly ripe when 
the Third District Court litigation was initiated, bars that claim now. Once again, the 
only reason the claim was not litigated was because Plaintiffs chose to rely entirely on the 
1995 Agreement. 
* The Macris court relied in part on Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983). 
And while Schaer involved claims relating to "property," the holding in Schaer was per-
fectly consistent with the principles set forth in Wheadon, AEM, and the other cases 
discussed in the text. In Schaer, the initial action, in 1967, was a condemnation 
proceeding against a property owner. The issue was not ownership of land, but rather the 
damages to be paid the owner for the taking. Schaer, 657 P.2d at 1338. In the second 
action, filed in 1979, the owner sued for a declaration that an existing access road 
constituted a "public thoroughfare." 
Schaer thus did not involve successive actions by the same person to establish 
ownership of the same property. The first action was against the owner, involving 
damages. The second action was by the owner. Neither action was to determine who 
owned the property at issue. Moreover, the second action in Schaer did not involve a 
claim that could have or should have been brought in the first action, as the court 
recognized that conditions could easily have changed in the intervening twelve years, so 
that a determination in 1967 could not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a claim in 
1979: "[Tjhere is nothing in its [1967] findings that would preclude another court twelve 
years later from finding that access is now reasonable, economical, and feasible by way 
of the dugway road." Id. at 1341. 
In contrast, the case presently before the Court involves successive actions by the 
same plaintiffs for ownership of the same property, both of which were based on events 
that took place before the first action was filed. 
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The doctrine of claim preclusion ensures that courts and litigants are not burdened 
by repetitive claims. In the present case, the Plaintiffs have already brought and litigated 
their claim to the leases. If res judicata did not apply to this situation, there would be 
nothing to prevent Plaintiffs from bringing suit after suit claiming an interest in the 
leases, until they run out of legal theories. This is exactly what the doctrine of res 
judicata is designed to prevent. 
2. Judge Hilder did not "recognize" the difference between the claims. 
The Court should immediately reject any suggestion by Plaintiffs that Judge 
Hilder "recognized" the "difference" between the claim under the 1995 Agreement and 
the claim under the joint venture theory. (See Appellants' Br. at 9.) First, the propriety of 
the Eighth District Court action, which had not even been filed yet, was not (and could 
not have been) at issue before Judge Hilder in the Third District Court Action. When 
Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint in that action to add their joint venture theory, 
Del-Rio opposed the motion on three grounds: (1) Amendment was not possible because 
the claim against Del-Rio had already been dismissed and appealed; (2) Plaintiffs should 
not be allowed to add a theory they had intentionally decided not to raise earlier; and 
(3) The proposed amendment was futile because Plaintiffs failed to allege any facts 
showing what interest they actually had in the leases. (See R. 347.) Nowhere in its 
opposition papers did Del-Rio even mention, let alone argue, whether res judicata would 
affect a second action raising the same claims. Nor, obviously, did Del-Rio cite any 
authority on the issue. 
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Moreover, contrary to Plaintiffs' representation, Judge Hilder did not "expressly 
rule . . . that Plaintiffs could, in any event, pursue1' a second action. (Appellants' Br. at 9.) 
Rather, Judge Hilder's discussion proceeded as follows: 
Plaintiffs are probably right on two points they urge. First, if they prevail 
on appeal and the matter is returned to this court, amendment is likely 
available. Second, if the statute of limitations has not run, they can file an 
independent action, if their new claim does, in fact, have an independent 
basis. What they cannot do is amend their claim against Del-Rio in this 
action at this time. 
(Order Denying Leave to Amend, R. 248.) Thus, Judge Hilder did not analyze the issue, 
consider the authority, and make a ruling. Rather, Judge Hilder merely expressed his 
opinion, having read no argument on the issue, that Plaintiffs were "probably" right that 
they could file a separate action. But it is clear that Judge Hilder was not making any 
ruling on the res judicata issue — and even if he had, such a ruling clearly would not have 
any binding effect on either the Eighth District Court or this Court. (And if he was mak-
ing such an advisory ruling, such a ruling would have been incorrect.) 
3. That the prior action was styled as a claim for "declaratory relief 
rather than to "quiet title" makes no difference. 
Finally, Plaintiffs cannot avoid res judicata simply because their prior action was 
styled as a claim for "declaratory relief instead of one to "quiet title." In their brief, 
Plaintiffs rely on a purported "rule," set forth in section 33 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Judgments, that certain declaratory judgment actions have limited preclusive effect. 
Plaintiffs cite no Utah authority, however, adopting that rule. Moreover, that rule would 
not govern the present case, for at least three reasons. 
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First, Plaintiffs1 prior lawsuit sought not only declaratory relief, but also "damages 
consistent with the Agreement and according to proof." (Third District Court Complaint, 
Add. Ex. B, R. 289.) One exception to the declaratory judgment rule is that when a 
complaint seeks "coercive" relief in addition to purely "declaratory" relief, the resolution 
of that action has the same res judicata effect as any other lawsuit. See, e.g., Winter v. 
Northcutt 879 S.W.2d 701, 706 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). 
Second, and more importantly, the "rule" on which Plaintiffs rely also has an 
exception for cases in which a party brings a "standard" action cast in declaratory form. 
Instead, when a plaintiff brings such an action, including a quiet title action, the ruling in 
that action has the same preclusive effect as any other action: 
Pleaders sometimes interpolate declaratory prayers redundantly in standard 
actions but this should not produce differences in the res judicata con-
sequences of those actions. Thus a pleader demanding money damages 
may also ask for a corresponding declaration. For res judicata purposes the 
action should be treated as an adversary personal action concluded by a 
personal judgment with the usual consequences of merger, bar, and issue 
preclusion. . . . So also an action to adjudicate interests in property, such 
as an action to quiet title, or to establish a status, such as divorce, may be 
cast in declaratory form. This should not alter the res judicata effects of 
the judgments. 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 33, cmt. d (1982) (emphasis added). 
Thus, even if Plaintiffs' supposed rule were applicable in Utah, Plaintiffs' claim 
would still be barred, because as explained in the comment to section 33 of the Restate-
ment, one cannot avoid the consequences of res judicata simply by typing the words 
"declaratory relief on the front of a complaint instead of the words "quiet title." Rather, 
in determining the res judicata effect of an action, a court will look to the substance of the 
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action. And the substance of the prior action is exactly the same as the substance of the 
present one: The prior action asked for the court to "declar[e]" that Plaintiffs had rights 
in the leases (Add. Ex. B, R. 289), and the present one asks the Court to "determine" that 
Plaintiffs have such rights (Add. Ex. C, R. 3). 
Third, there is simply no practical or substantive difference between an action 
seeking to establish an interest in property through a declaratory judgment and one 
seeking to establish an interest by quieting title.9 Indeed, courts have repeatedly recog-
nized that the two types of actions are interchangeable. See, e.g.. Winter, 879 S.W.2d at 
706 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (action for slander of title was barred under res judicata by prior 
action for declaratory judgment; court noted that "there may be little, if any, difference 
between an action to quiet title and an action for declaratory judgment"); Southwest 
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hardy Road 13.4 Joint Venture, 981 S.W.2d 951, 956-57 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1998) (where plaintiff sought declaratory judgment that lien was void, attorney fees 
were not proper because the "declaratory judgment claim is really one to quiet title. Both 
claims seek to clear the property's title, are based on the same facts, and request similar 
relief."); Shapiro v. Prince George's County, 149 A.2d 396, 303 (Md. Ct. App. 1959) 
("[T]here is nothing novel in bringing a declaratory action for the purpose of quieting 
9
 There is no difference between a "declaration" as authorized by the Declaratory 
Judgment Act (Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1) and a "determination" as authorized by the 
Quiet Title Act (Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-1 et seq.). Obviously, before a court "declares" 
what someone's rights are, the court will (hopefully) "determine" what those rights are. 
Similarly, for a court's "determination" of interests in property to have any effect, the 
court must "declare" what those interests are. Put another way, a declaration without a 
prior determination is just a guess, and a determination without a subsequent declaration 
is just a private thought. 
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title."); Kirstein v. Kirstein, 306 S.E.2d 552, 553 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) ("[A] Declaratory 
Judgment is the appropriate action to perform the duty of quieting title to real property."). 
In fact, the treatise upon which Plaintiffs rely for the declaratory judgment rule, Actions 
for Declaratory Judgments, also recognizes that "[a] declaratory action is an appropriate 
remedy to perform the function of the customary action to quiet title. Indeed, an action 
to quiet title is essentially an action for declaratory relief" 2 Walter H. Anderson, 
Actions for Declaratory Judgments § 604, at 1354-55 (2d ed. 1951) (emphasis added). 
The Third District Court action had exactly the same purpose and effect as a basic 
quiet title action: To obtain an interest in the leases. And had Plaintiffs prevailed in the 
Third District Court, that would have had the same effect as if they had prevailed in a 
quiet title action: Del-Rio would have lost a portion of its interests in the leases. There is 
simply no basis for Plaintiffs' argument that a declaratory judgment action is somehow 
"different" from a quiet title action. 
Res judicata is not about labels, but about important policy considerations of 
finality, judicial economy, and outright fairness. It is simply unfair for Del-Rio to have to 
keep defending its ownership of the leases. Once again, if Plaintiffs1 position were 
correct, they could keep filing claims against the leases, pursuing one legal theory at a 
time, as long as they purported to seek a "declaratory" judgment each time. This, of 
course, would be absurd. 
The bottom line is that there is no justification for allowing Plaintiffs to proceed 
with this claim. As they admitted, Plaintiffs made a strategic choice when they filed their 
first action to proceed solely on the basis of the 1995 Agreement. Under the rules of res 
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judicata, Plaintiffs have to live with that choice. Accordingly, the trial court correctly 
ruled that the present action, which sought the same relief as the prior one, should be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
Enough is enough. Res judicata exists to prevent repeated litigation of the same 
claims, and to ensure that the parties' complete dispute is resolved in a single action. 
Allowing Plaintiffs to flout these principles by pursuing this successive action, bringing 
claims that clearly could have and should have been brought in the first action, would 
make a mockery of the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in Del-Rio's favor should therefore be affirmed. 
DATED: June _/_, 2005. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Jtf*- I / ^ 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
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Attorneys for Appellees Del-Rio Resources, 
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G. Memorandum in Reply to Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Leave to File First Amended Complaint Against Del Rio Resources [Third 
District Court] 
H. American Estate Management v. International Investment & Development 
Corp., 1999 UT App 232, 986 P.2d 765 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN UNITED MINES, INC., 
SYNDICATORS, INC., J.R. KIRK, JR., 
and STEVEN D. MARTENS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DEL-RIO RESOURCES, INC., DEL-RIO 
DRILLING PROGRAMS, INC., DAN K. 
SHAW, DOES 1 - XXXXX 
Defendants. 
RULING 
Case No. 030800426 
Judge John R. Anderson 
The Court having received defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition, and defendant's Reply, having reviewed the pleadings and being 
otherwise fully informed, the Court enters the following: 
Although plaintiffs have attempted to raise a new and independent cause of action from 
the preceding action filed in the Third District Court, plaintiffs' prior and present actions assert 
essentially only one claim - the final determination of rights in the 10 leases. As such, the 
present claims are subject to claim preclusion as they are res judicata. Plaintiffs' consciously 
chose not to raise the theory of breach of the joint venture partnership in the present action, even 
though the issue was ripe when plaintiffs' filed the action in the Third District Court. As a result, 
plaintiffs' cannot attempt to relitigate the same claim simply based upon a new legal theory of 
liability. 
Based upon the above, and the reasoning contained in defendant's Memorandum in 
Support and Reply, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED. 
Dated this >/>4 day of September, 2004 
ohn R. Anderson, District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on September 22, 2004,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Ruling to the following: 
Dan K. Shaw 
630 Trade Center Drive 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 
Del-Rio Resources, Inc. 
Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc. 
c/o Gerald Nielson, Esq. 
3737 Honeycutt Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Western United Mines, Inc. 
Syndicators, Inc. 
J. Rex Kirk, Jr. 
Steven D. Martens 
c/o of their attorney 
Donald L..Dalton, Esq. 
DALTON & KELLEY 
P.O. Box 58084 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158 
Max D. Wheeler, Esq. 
Rex E. Madsen, Esq. 
Stanley J. Preston, Esq. 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 4500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq. 
Stephen P. Horvat, Esq. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Deputy Clerk 
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DALTON & KELLEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Post Office Box 58084 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158 
Telephone: (801)583-2510 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN UNITED MINES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, S YNDICATORS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, J. R. KIRK, JR., an individual, and 
STEVEN D. MARTENS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
Vs. 
DAN K. SHAW, an individual, and DEL-RIO 
RESOURCES, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
' COMPLAINT FOR 
DECLARATORY RELIEF; MONEY 
DAMAGES 
Case No, 010906368 
Honorable Roger A. Livinston 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, complain of defendants for declaratory 
relief and money damages, alleging as follows; 
1. Plaintiff Western United Mines, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently 
existing, in good standing, under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal 
place of business in Tooele County. 
i&2> 
2. Plaintiff Syndicators, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently existing, in good 
standing, under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal place of business in 
Salt Lake County. 
3. Plaintiff J. R. Kirk, Jr. is an individual residing in Tooele County. 
4. Plaintiff Steven D. Martens is an individual residing in Salt Lake County. 
5. Defendant Dan K. Shaw is an individual residing in Utah County. 
6. Defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently 
existing, in good standing, under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal 
place of business in Uintah County. 
7. Defendants are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court, and the case may be tried in 
this Court for the convenience of the parties. Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-1; 
8. The parties hereto are parties to an "Agreement" dated May 12,1995, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached hereto. 
9. The Agreement provides in pertinent part for the assignment, to Shaw, of interests 
in two federal oil and gas leases (Mineral Lease No. U 10166 & U 019837) and two 
state oil and gas leases (Mineral Lease No. 44317 & 44318). 
10. The Agreement also provides for the funding, by Shaw, of litigation against the 
United States in which the parties hereto, excluding Shaw, were plaintiffs, Del-Rio 
Drilling Programs, Inc., et al v. The United States, United States Claims Court, 
CaseNo.569-86L. 
11. The Agreement provides that Shaw would 4Cuse his best efforts to enter into an 
agreement with the plaintiffs of such lawsuit to provide a maximum of thirty 
^ 0 1 
thousand dollars ($30,000) to fund certain future expenses incurred by plaintiffs in 
such litigation." 
12. The Agreement provides that with respect to the $30,000 in litigation expenses, 
"[n]o expenses shall be paid by Shaw directly to persons who are plaintiffs in the 
litigation or to affiliates of plaintiffs." 
13. The Agreement provides that u[a]ny agreement between the plaintiffs and Shaw 
shall provide that if, as a result of the litigation, additional leases are awarded, such 
leases shall be assigned to Shaw (or his affiliates); provided, however, plaintiff 
shall be entitled to a fifty percent (50%) beneficial interest in such additional 
leases." 
14. Shaw did in fact fund the lawsuit pursuant to agreement with plaintiffs. 
15. The lawsuit was settled pursuant to the terms of a "Settlement Agreement," a true 
and correct copy of which is attached hereto. 
16. The Settlement Agreement provides in pertinent part for extension of the terms of 
10 federal oil and gas leases, which do not include the two in the Agreement 
17 The terms of the 10 leasbs would have expired without the litigation and the 
agreement contained in the Settlement Agreement extending their terms. 
18. Defendants herein expressly characterized those 10 leases as "returned leases." 
19. Plaintiffs are entitled to a beneficial interest in the 10 leases according to the 
Agreement. 
20. The Settlement Agreement also provides for a proposal that 8 tracts or sections of 
land be offered for lease. 
•nf\l 
21. Plaintiffs do not know if any of the 8 tracts or sections has been offered for lease. 
22. If so, plaintiffs are entitled to a beneficial interest in the 8 tracts or sections 
according to the Agreement. 
23. The Settlement Agreement also provides for a cash award to plaintiffs of $300,000. 
24. Plaintiffs are entitled to interest in the $300,000 cash award according to the 
Agreement. 
25. Defendants in this case have proposed distribution of the settlement with the United 
States in a manner that is inconsistent with the Agreement. 
26. Specifically, defendants have denied plaintiffs Western United Mines, Inc., J. R. 
Kirk, Jr. and Steven D. Martens any interest in the 10 federal oil and gas leases. 
27. Defendants have proposed a distribution of interest in the leases to plaintiff 
Syndicators, Inc. that is less than what is provided for by the Agreement 
28. Defendants have denied plaintiffs any interest in the cash award. 
29. Defendants have proposed a reimbursement to Shaw for litigation expenses that is 
inconsistent with the Settlement Agreement. 
30. Plaintiffs objected, in writing, to the proposed distribution. 
31. However, defendants notified plaintiffs that they intended to proceed with the 
proposed distribution notwithstanding plaintiffs' objection. 
32. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaration of a beneficial interest in the 10 federal oil and 
gas leases that is consistent with the Agreement. 
33. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaration of a beneficial interest in the 8 tracts or 
sections, assuming they have been offered for lease, consistent with the Agreement. 
34. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration of interest in the $300,000 cash award that is 
consistent with the Agreement. 
35. Alternatively, plaintiffs are entitled to damages consistent with the Agreement and 
according to proof. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for Judgment against defendants for (1) declaration 
of a beneficial interest in the 10 federal oil and gas leases that is consistent with the 
Agreement; (2) declaration of a beneficial interest in the 8 tracts or sections, assuming they 
have been offered for lease, which is consistent with the Agreement; (3) declaration of an 
interest in the $300,000 cash award that is consistent with the Agreement; (4) alternatively, 
damages consistent with the Agreement and according to proof; and (5) such other and 
further relief as is just and proper. 
DATED this H,* day of July, 2001. 
DALTON & KELLEY 
Donald L. Daftbn 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
, u V.'r " 
WESTERN UNITED MINES, INC., 
SYNDICATORS, INC., J. REX KIRK, JR. and 
STEVEN D. MARTENS, 
Plaintiffs, 
Vs. 
DEL-RIO RESOURCES, INC., DEL-RIO 
DRILLING PROGRAMS, INC., DAN K. 
SHAW, DOES I-XXXXX, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
Case No. Oh<*%<*$ <43-U ? ^ 
Honorable ^J^Y-v^ K, / " tW^rS<TY^ . 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, complain of defendants, and for causes of 
action, allege as follows: 
1. Plaintiff Western United Mines, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently 
existing, in good standing, under the laws of the State of Utah with its principal 
place of business in Tooele County. 
Plaintiff Syndicators, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently existing, in 
good standing, under the laws of the State of Utah with its principal place of 
business in Salt Lake County. 
Plaintiff J. R. Kirk, Jr. is an individual residing in Tooele County. 
Plaintiff Steven D. Martens is an individual residing in Salt Lake County. 
Defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently 
existing, in good standing, under the laws of the State of Utah with its principal 
place of business in Uintah County.. 
Defendant Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc. is a corporation organized and 
presently existing, in good standing, under the laws of the State of Utah with 
its principal place of business in Uintah County. 
Defendant Dan K. Shaw is an individual residing in Utah County. 
Does I-XXXXX are persons claiming interest in the oil and gas or geothermal 
property that is the subject of this action. 
The property is located entirely within Uintah County. 
It is known generally as the "Flatrock Property." 
The property was originally developed and/or reworked by'plaintiffs Western 
United and Syndicators, along with defendant Del-Rio Resources, acting as 
"Joint Venture Partners." 
The parties made reference to the Joint Venture Partnership in documents that 
were intended for the public. 
<? , 
13. As further evidence of the Joint Venture Partnership, the parties had 
interlocking officers and directors. 
14. In accordance with the terms of the Joint Venture Partnership, the three parties 
were to share equally in the development of the property. 
15. Del-Rio Resources was the designated operator of the Joint Venture 
Partnership, and its wholly-owned subsidiary, defendant Del-Rio Drilling 
Programs, was the designated operator of the Oil Canyon II Unit. 
16. However, each of the Joint Venture Partners contributed financial resources to 
the development of the property. 
17. In accordance with the Joint Venture Partnership, and acting as Joint Venture 
Partners, Western United, Syndicators and Del-Rio Resources successfully 
completed one oil and gas well (Flatrock (Oil Canyon) 29-1 A) and re-worked 
two additional wells (Flatrock 30-1 A, 30-2A). 
18. They then drilled an additional well (30-3 A), but it was abandoned because of 
the collapse of a drilling rig. 
19. They then drilled one additional well (26-1 A) that was within the Oil Canyon 
II Unit. 
20. Production from this well would have held the leases in the Oil Canyon II Unit. 
21. The Joint Venture Partnership spent a minimum of $2,935,81 LOO in the above 
drilling program. 
22. In addition, they incurred substantial expense constructing a pipeline to 
accommodate those wells. 
'1 o 
By drilling the wells, they also obtained the exclusive right to drill additional 
wells in the area, the value of which was enhanced by the proven production 
from the existing wells (BLM Lease U-10166). 
However, the Joint Venture Partnership drilling program ground to a halt when 
surface access was denied by the Ute Indian Tribe. 
Negotiations with the U.S. Government, through the Joint Venture 
Partnership's legal counsel, came to no effect. 
As a result, the Joint Venture Partners, along with others claiming minor 
interests in certain of the property, filed suit against the U.S. Government: 
Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc., et al v. United States, United States Court of 
Federal Claims, No. 569-86L (the "Claims Court Litigation"). 
There were others with interests in the property, but they did not want to 
become involved in the Claims Court Litigation, and as a matter of "good oil 
field practice," their interests in the property were assigned to Del-Rio Drilling 
Programs as the designated operator of the unit. 
The same goes for title to the Joint Venture Partnership's interest in the 
property. 
In accordance with good oil field practice, most of the property was titled in 
the name of the Unit operator, defendant Del-Rio Drilling Programs. 
However, no one objected to the fact that Western United, Syndicators and 
plaintiffs J. Rex Kirk, Jr. and Steven D. Martens were named as plaintiffs in 
i 
the Claims Court Litigation with interest in the property according to the Joint 
Venture Partnership and otherwise. 
31. The Claims Court Litigation was filed in 1986 and lasted for 14 years. 
32. In 2000, there were settlement discussions that led to the Claims Court 
Litigation being settled. 
33. In accordance with the tenns of the Settlement Agreement, which was signed 
on or around March 15, 2001, there was a cash payment of $300,000. 
34. In addition, the primary terms of 10 leases (BLM Leases U-6610, 6612, U-
6632, U-6634, U-10162, U-10163, U-10164, U-10165, U-18726, and U-
27043) were "tolled during the pendency of this [Litigation], and the primary 
lease terms [were] extended to three (3) years from the date the case is 
dismissed." 
35. That date was later confirmed as April 20,2001. 
36. Each of these leases was within the Oil Canyon II Unit. 
37. In fact, the 26-1A well was drilled on Lease U-10165. 
38. In addition, eight tracts of land were offered for leases, those tracts being: 
T14S, R20E Sec. 31, 33; T14S, R20E Sec. 34; T14S, R19E Sec. 26, 35; T15S, 
R20E Sec. 3,4, 5. 
39. No one denied plaintiffs' interest in the settlement proceeds or in the above 
property, all located within Uintah County, until after the Claims Court 
Litigation was settled, which was prior to execution of the Settlement 
Agreement. 
'j 
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40. At that time, February 21, 2001, Del-Rio Resources, "acting on behalf of Del 
Rio Drilling Programs, [as] the lead plaintiff in the [Claims Court Litigation]," 
proposed distribution of the settlement assets in a manner that was inconsistent 
with the Joint Venture Partnership and otherwise. 
41. Even though the Settlement Agreement had not at that time been signed, Del-
Rio Resources unilaterally imposed a deadline of March 7, 2001 by which to 
respond to the "Proposed Settlement Asset Distribution." 
42. Plaintiffs retained counsel who responded on March 6, 2001 objecting to the 
proposed distribution. 
43. At that time, plaintiffs objected on the basis of an Agreement between the 
parties dated May 12,1995, which did not concern the Joint Venture 
Partnership, but rather its financial arrangements with defendant Dan K. Shaw. 
44. The discussions that followed did not lead to a negotiated settlement. 
45. Therefore, plaintiffs filed action in the District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Western United Mines, Inc., etal v. Shaw, etal9 Case No. 010906368. 
46. Later in the action, plaintiffs attempted to join these claims, but, for technical 
reasons, the District Court denied Plaintiffs Motion for Leave. 
47. In doing so, the Court specifically ruled (Minute Entry and Order dated March 
29,2003): "If the statute of limitations has not run, [plaintiffs herein] can file 
an independent action, if their new claim [sic] does, in fact, have an 
independent basis." 
48. The statute of limitations is 4-years from the date of defendants' Proposed 
Settlement Asset Distribution, and plaintiffs' new claims do, in fact, have a 
basis that is independent of the May 12,1995 Agreement. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Quiet Title) 
49. Defendants claim an interest in the property that is the subject of this action 
that is adverse to the interest of plaintiffs under the Joint Venture Partnership 
and otherwise. 
50. Specifically, defendants claim that Western United, J. Rex Kirk, Jr. and Steven 
D. Martens have no interest in the subject property even though they were 
plaintiffs in the Claims Court Litigation. 
51. Furthermore, defendants claim that Syndicators only has interest in three of the 
Leases that were the subject of the Claims Court Litigation. 
52. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that with the single 
exception noted above, Del-Rio Drilling Programs claims all right, title and 
interest in and to the subject property. 
53. However, plaintiffs are further informed and believe and on that basis allege 
that defendant Dan K. Shaw claims some interest in the subject property 
though it is not presently or record. 
54. The interests of the parties in the subject property should be determined in 
accordance with the Joint Venture Partnership and otherwise pursuant to UCA 
§ 78-40-1, etseq. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Constructive Trust) 
55. Even though Del-Rio Drilling Programs holds title to most of the property that 
is the subject of this action, its wholly-owning parent (Del-Rio Resources) is 
under an equitable duty to convey title to plaintiffs in accordance with the Joint 
Venture Partnership and otherwise. 
56. Del-Rio Resources and its wholly-owned subsidiary would be unjustly 
enriched if they were permitted to retain title. 
57. The property is subject to a constructive in favor of plaintiffs. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Breach of the Joint Venture Partnership) 
58. If for whatever reason plaintiffs' interest in the real property cannot be 
determined and conveyed in accordance with the Joint Venture Partnership and 
otherwise, defendant Del-Rio Resources is liable for damages for breach of the 
Joint Venture Partnership. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for Judgment against defendants in accordance with 
the allegations above and their proof at trial or otherwise; and for such other and further 
relief as is just and proper. 
DATED this fiv^ay of June, 2003. 
D ALTON & KELLEY 
Donald L. Dalton 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
J * 
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Shawn T. Welch (#7113) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN UNITED MINES, 
INC. a Utah corporation, 
SYNDICATORS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, J.R. KIRK, JR., an ORDER AND 
individual, and STEVEN D. : SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
MARTENS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. : Case No. 010906368 
Judge Roger A. Livingston 
DAN K. SHAW, an individual, : 
and DEL-RIO RESOURCES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, : 
Defendants. 
FILED DISTINCT COURT 
Third Judicial D !s?rict 
l^x 
1
 s 2002 Kiev H 
•t LAKE COUNT\ 
ay-
D f t Duty Clerk 
The Court heard oral argument on Defendants Dan K. Shaw's and Del-Rio 
Resources, Inc.'s Joint Motion for Summary Judgment on October 28, 2002 in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Thomas A. Karrenberg appeared on behalf of Defendant Del-Rio 
Resources, Inc.; A. John Davis and Shawn T. Welch appeared on behalf of Defendant 
Dan K. Shaw; and Donald L. Dalton appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs Western United 
Mines, Inc., Syndicators, Inc., J.R. Kirk, Jr., and Steven D. Martens. The Court, 
having reviewed the Defendants' Joint Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition and Defendants' Joint 
Reply Memorandum, and having heard counsel's oral arguments, hereby makes the 
following findings of fact, conclusions of law and order of partial summary judgment in 
favor of Defendants Shaw and Del-Rio Resources. 
ORDER AND SUMMARY JTUDGMENT 
1. This action concerns an agreement dated May 12, 1995 (the "1995 
Agreement"), wherein defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc. and Plaintiffs assigned 
certain oil and gas leases to defendant Shaw in settlement of a debt owed to defendant 
Shaw. 
2. Paragraphs 4 through 4.2 of the 1995 Agreement reference a lawsuit then 
pending in the United States Court of Claims involving a claim for money damages 
relating to certain oil and gas leases. The case was styled Del-Rio Drilling Programs, 
Inc., et al. vs. United States, Case No. 569-86L (hereinafter the "Federal Action"). 
o 
The Plaintiffs in the Federal Action included the Plaintiffs herein, Defendant Del-Rio 
Resources and some 22 other individuals and entities (the "Federal Plaintiffs"). 
3. The oil and gas leases at issue in the Federal Action consisted of ten 
Federal oil and gas leases identified as follows: U-6610, U-6612, U-6632, U-6634, U-
10162, U-10163, U-10164, U-10165, U-1876, and U-27043 ("Federal Leases"). 
4. Paragraph 4 of the 1995 Agreement references the "various individuals 
and companies" who were plaintiffs in the Federal Action, and provides: 
As additional consideration for Del Rio, Western, Syndicators, Kirk 
Caldwell and Martens entering into this Agreement, Shaw shall use his 
best efforts to enter into an agreement with the plaintiffs of such lawsuit to 
provide a maximum of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000.00) to fund 
certain future expenses incurred by plaintiffs in such litigation 
5. Paragraph 4.1 of the 1995 Agreement provides, in relevant part: "Any 
agreement between the Plaintiffs and Shaw shall provide that if, as a result of the 
litigation, additional leases are awarded, such leases shall be assigned to Shaw (or his 
affiliates); provided, however, plaintiffs shall be entitled to a 50% beneficial interest in 
such additional leases." 
6. Paragraph 4.2 of the 1995 Agreement provides, in relevant part: 
Any agreement between plaintiff(s) and Shaw shall provide that, as a 
result of the litigation, a cash settlement is awarded to plaintiffs, Shaw 
shall be reimbursed for all expenses of litigation paid by Shaw and the 
balance of the proceeds shall be delivered free and clear of the claims of 
Shaw, to plaintiffs as damages and for payment of other expenses and 
costs of the litigation. 
3 „ 
7. The Federal Action was resolved by a Settlement Agreement dated March 
13, 2001, which stated that the terms of the ten Federal Leases at issue in the Federal 
Action were deemed "tolled" during the pendency of the Federal Action and were 
extended for three years from the date of settlement. In addition, the United States 
Bureau of Land Management agreed to pay the Federal Plaintiffs $300,000.00 in 
damages. 
8. Plaintiffs herein sued Defendants asking this Court for a declaration that 
the 1995 Agreement entitled them to an interest in the ten Federal Leases as well as an 
interest in the $300,000.00 cash award, or in the alternative, damages consistent with 
the 1995 Agreement. 
9. The 1995 Agreement does not grant Plaintiffs herein any interest in the 
ten Federal Leases or the $300,000 cash award in the Federal Action, and Plaintiffs' 
claims thereunder are denied with prejudice. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED THAT:. 
1. Defendants Dan K. Shaw and Del-Rio Resources, Inc.'s Joint Motion For 
Summary Judgment Against Plaintiffs is hereby granted. 
2. The Court hereby grants Plaintiffs leave to amend Plaintiffs' Complaint 
herein to state a claim for damages against defendant Dan K. Shaw for breach of the 
"best efforts to enter into an agreement" provision in Paragraph 4 of the 1995 
4 
settlement. In granting such right to amend, the Court in no way rules as to the merit 
of Plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs shall file such amendment within ten days of the entry of 
this Order and Judgment. 
3. Each party shall bear its respective costs herein. 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT 
Consistent with Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,. the Court 
hereby directs entry of the above order and judgment as final judgment. In directing a 
final judgment as to same, the Court specifically and expressly finds that there is no just 
reason for delay and that judgment shall be and is final as to the above-referenced 
matters. 
Dated this 
4 
day of November, 2002. 
Approved as to Form: 
, District Court Judge 
DALTON & KELLEY 
By:. L 
Jbnald L. Dalton 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
ANDERSON 
By:_ 
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m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN UNITED MINES, INC, a Utah 
corporation, SYNDICATORS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, J. R. KIRK, JR, an individual, and 
STEVEN D. MARTENS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
Vs. 
DAN K. SHAW, an individual, and DEL-RIO 
RESOURCES, INC, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Case No. 010906368 
Honorable Robert K. Hilder 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, complain of defendants for causes of 
action for breach of contract and/or declaratory relief, alleging as follows: 
1. Plaintiff Western United Mines, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently 
existing, in good standing, under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal 
place of business in Tooele County. 
2. Plaintiff Syndicators, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently existing, in good 
standing, under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal place of business in 
Salt Lake County. 
3. Plaintiff J. R. Kirk, Jr. is an individual residing in Tooele County. 
4. Plaintiff Steven D. Martens is an individual residing in Salt Lake County. 
5. Defendant Dan K. Shaw is an individual residing in Utah County. 
6. Defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently 
existing, in good standing, under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal 
place of business in Uintah County. 
7. Defendants are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court, and the case may be tried in 
this Court for the convenience of the parties. Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-1. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract; Dan K. Shaw) 
8. The parties hereto are parties to an "Agreement" dated May 12, 1995, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached to plaintiffs' Complaint. 
9. The Agreement provides in pertinent part for the assignment, to defendant Dan K. 
Shaw ("Shaw"), of interests in two federal oil and gas leases (Mineral Lease No. U 
10166 & U 019837) and two state oil and gas leases (Mineral Lease No. 44317 & 
44318). 
10. The Agreement also provides for the funding, by Shaw, of litigation against the 
United States in which the parties hereto, excluding Shaw, were plaintiffs, Del-Rio 
Drilling Programs, Inc., et al v. The United States, United States Claims Court, 
Case No. 569-86L (the "Claims Court Litigation"). 
11. The 1995 Agreement provides that Shaw would "use his best efforts to enter into 
an agreement with the plaintiffs of such lawsuit to provide a maximum of thirty 
thousand dollars ($30,000) to fund certain future expenses incurred by plaintiffs in 
such litigation.55 
12. The 1995 Agreement provides that u[a]ny agreement between the plaintiffs and 
Shaw shall provide that if, as a result of the litigation, additional leases are 
awarded, such leases shall be assigned to Shaw (or his affiliates); provided, 
however, plaintiff shall be entitled to a fifty percent (50%) beneficial interest in 
such additional leases." 
13. Shaw did in fact fund the Claims Court Litigation, but denies that this was pursuant 
to an agreement with plaintiffs. 
14. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that if Shaw failed to 
enter into an agreement with plaintiffs in the Claims Court Litigation, Shaw failed 
to use best efforts and breached the 1995 Agreement. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Declaratory Relief and/or Breach of Contract; 
Del-Rio Resources, Inc.) 
15. The Claims Court Litigation was settled pursuant to the terms of a "Settlement 
Agreement," a true and correct copy of which is attached to plaintiffs' Complaint. 
16. The Settlement Agreement provides in pertinent part for extension of the terms of 
10 federal oil and gas leases, which do not include the two in the Agreement. 
17. The Settlement Agreement also provides for a cash award to plaintiffs of $300,000. 
18. Defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc. (uDel-Rio") has proposed distribution of the 
settlement with the United States in a manner that is inconsistent with the claims 
that were made by plaintiffs in the Claims Court Litigation and plaintiffs' actual 
rights and interest therein. 
19. Specifically, Del-Rio has denied plaintiffs Western United Mines, Inc., J. R. Kirk, 
Jr. and Steven D. Martens any interest in the 10 federal oil and gas leases though 
they appeared as plaintiffs in the Claims Court Litigation with specific interests in 
the leases. 
20. Del-Rio has proposed a distribution of interest in the leases to plaintiff Syndicators, 
Inc. that is less than its actual right and interest. 
21. Finally, Del-Rio has denied plaintiffs any interest in the cash award, 
22. According to Del-Rio, "the majority of the leases will eventually be returned to Del 
Rio Drilling Programs," for whom Del-Rio was admittedly acting in the Claims 
Court Litigation. 
23. However, Del-Rio and plaintiffs Western United Mines, Inc. and Syndicators, Inc. 
were "joint venture partners" in the development of some or all of the property that 
was the subject of the Claims Court Litigation in which they were to equally share. 
24. Plaintiffs are entitled to declaration of their actual interest in the oil and gas leases 
and cash award from the Claims Court Litigation. 
25. Alternatively, plaintiffs are entitled to damages consistent with the joint venture 
partnership and according to proof. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for Judgment (1) against Shaw for damages for 
breach of the 1995 Agreement; and (2) against Del-Rio for declaration of plaintiffs* actual 
interest in the oil and gas leases and cash award that resulted from the settlement of the 
Claims Court Litigation; and alternatively, for damages for breach of the joint venture 
partnership; and for such other and further relief as just and proper. 
DATED this of November, 2002. 
DALTON & KELLEY 
*Ml^Jttt v^ k— 
Donald L. Dalton 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN UNITED MINES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, SYNDICATORS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, J. R. KIRK, JR., an individual, and 
STEVEN D. MARTENS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
Vs. 
DAN K. SHAW, an individual, and DEL-RIO 
RESOURCES, INC.; a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Case No. 010906368 
Honorable Robert K. Hilder 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, respectfully submit the following 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint: 
At the hearing on October 28,2002, the Court (Honorable Roger A. Livingston) 
granted defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. At the same time, the Court granted 
plaintiffs leave to file a First Amended Complaint stating a claim against defendant Dan K. 
Shaw for breach of the "best efforts" clause in the 1995 Agreement. 
The Court's action has required further amendment of the Complaint, specifically, 
a claim against defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc. for declaration of plaintiffs' rights and 
interest in the oil and gas leases and cash award that resulted from the settlement of the 
Claims Court Litigation. 
In their original Complaint, plaintiffs sought a declaration of their rights and 
interest in the oil and gas leases and cash award pursuant to the terms of the 1995 
Agreement. However, the Court's ruling was that the 1995 Agreement granted plaintiffs 
no rights or interest in the oil and gas leases or cash award. 
Plaintiffs' amended claim against defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc. is not based 
on the 1995 Agreement. As evidenced by the pleadings on file in the Claims Court 
Litigation, plaintiffs have rights and interest in the leases and cash award that are 
independent of the 1995 Agreement. 
At the time this action was filed, plaintiffs did not think it was necessary to state 
such a claim because they thought their rights and interest were clear from the 1995 
Agreement. Plaintiffs' proposed amendment brings all of plaintiffs' claims to the leases 
and cash award into this action where they can be decided once and for all. 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs request leave to file their First Amended 
Complaint. 
2 
DATED this l2Jt/"3ay of November, 2002. 
DALTON & KELLEY 
[fluut^XDmh^ *y. . . 
Donald L. Dalton 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN UNITED MINES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, SYNDICATORS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, J. R KIRK, JR., an individual, and 
STEVEN D. MARTENS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
Vs. 
DAN K. SHAW, an individual, and DEL-RIO 
RESOURCES, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO 
MEMORANDUM OPPOSING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO FILE FIRST 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
AGAINST DEL RIO RESOURCES 
Case No. 010906368 
Honorable Robert K. Hilder 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, respectfully submit the following 
Memorandum in Reply to Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File 
First Amended Complaint Against Del Rio Resources ("Del-Rio"): 
INTRODUCTION 
Del-Rio makes too much out of the fact that plaintiffs' Complaint against Del-Rio 
was dismissed. Under normal circumstances, the dismissal would not have affected the 
pendency of this action in which plaintiffs, according to the leave that "shall be freely 
given" under URCP 15, would have been permitted to amend their claims against Del-Rio. 
In fact, since the dismissal did not adjudicate the rights and liabilities of all the parties, the 
Order and Summary Judgment would have been "subject to revision at any time before the 
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties:' URCP 54(b) 
The only thing that changed this normal order of business was the Court's 
certification of the Order and Summary Judgment as final under URCP 54(b), This made 
the Order and Judgment final and appealable even though it did not adjudicate the rights 
and liabilities of all the parties. Because of this, plaintiffs were required to appeal, which 
they did in a timely fashion. (Case No. Case No. 20021064-SC) What Del-Rio has failed 
to mention is that if plaintiffs prevail on their appeal, Del-Rio will be right back in this 
action on plaintiffs' original claim. This should answer Del-Rio's contention about 
"prejudice." 
In reality, the amendment of plaintiffs' claim against Del-Rio was necessitated by 
the Court's ruling on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs thought that 
the 1995 Agreement clearly established their rights in the 10 oil and gas leases that are and 
have been the subject of this action. There would have been no need for the amendment if 
the unambiguous provisions of the Agreement had been enforced. Since that claim is 
closely related to the one that plaintiffs have asserted against Del-Rio in their First 
Amended Complaint, it makes sense to keep them in the same case. 
There really is no good reason to deny plaintiffs' Motion. If they are not permitted 
to amend their Complaint against Del-Rio in this case, they will simply file another. 
(There is no problem with the statute of limitations.) There is no way that it would more 
"prejudicial" for Del-Rio to answer a new claim in this action than to answer another 
Complaint in a new action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Attached hereto is. a "Proposed Settlement Asset Distribution." This was prepared 
by Del-Rio and was in reference to settlement of the Court of Claims Litigation, "Del Rio 
et al vs. USA," which, in its Memorandum in Opposition, Del-Rio calls the "Federal 
Litigation." 
This is what started the litigation in this case. Del-Rio proposed a distribution of 
the settlement proceeds that was not in accordance with the parties' interests. For example, 
even though Western United Mines, Inc., J.R. Kirk, Jr. and Steven D. Martens were 
plaintiffs in the Federal Litigation, they were denied any interest in the proposed asset 
distribution. 
At the time they filed this action, plaintiffs were informed that defendant Dan K. 
Shaw had, in accordance with his obligations under the 1995 Agreement, entered into an 
agreement with plaintiffs in the Federal Litigation to provide funding for litigation 
expenses. Evidence of this was the undisputed fact that Shaw, who otherwise had no 
interest in the Federal Litigation, provided upwards of $18,000 in litigation funding. 
Plaintiffs were further informed that Shaw had entered into agreement with Del-Rio 
to acquire some interest in the 10 Federal oil and gas leases that were the subject of the 
Federal Litigation. In fact, even though it denies having made such an agreement with 
Shaw, Del-Rio has never denied that it intends to make such an agreement with Shaw. 
Therefore, plaintiffs claimed interest in those leases according to the following 
provision from the 1995 Agreement: "Any agreement between the plaintiffs and Shaw 
shall provide that if, as a result of the [Federal Litigation], additional leases are awarded, 
such leases shall be assigned to Shaw (or his affiliates); provided, however, plaintiffs shall 
be entitled to a fifty percent (50%) beneficial interest in such additional leases." 
That was the basis for plaintiffs' claims against Del-Rio and Shaw in this action. It 
never occurred to them that the 1995 Agreement granted them no interest, not even a 
possibly executory interest, in those leases. In fact, defendants never made such a claim in 
this case. Obviously, the Court thought otherwise. However, it did so for a reason that 
was not raised by defendants in their Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court concluded, as a matter of law, that the 1995 Agreement granted plaintiffs 
no interest in any leases, not even the "additional leases" mentioned in the Agreement. 
That ruling seems plainly contraindicated by the express language of the 1995 Agreement. 
In any event, that plain and express language is the basis for plaintiffs' appeal. 
The claim that plaintiffs are raising against Del-Rio is not dependent on the 1995 
Agreement. Plaintiffs have clearly alleged (1(23) the existence of a "joint venture 
partnership" between Del-Rio and plaintiffs Western United Mines, Inc. and Syndicators, 
Inc. by which they were to "equally share" in the development of the leases at issue. 
In the very first paragraph of the Proposed Settlement Asset Distribution, Del-Rio 
states that it was "acting on behalf of Del Rio Drilling Programs" in the Federal Litigation. 
Del-Rio went on to state that it was "the lead plaintiff in the above named lawsuit." This 
only stands to reason since Del-Rio has conceded that Del Rio Drilling Programs is its 
"subsidiary." (Pg. 2) 
Therefore, even though "the majority of the leases will eventually be returned to 
Del Rio Drilling Programs," it is clear that the actual party in interest is Del-Rio, corporate 
parent of Del Rio Drilling Programs and "lead plaintiff in the Federal Litigation. If 
necessary, plaintiffs can further amend their Complaint to add Del-Rio Drilling Programs. 
However, plaintiffs do not believe that Del-Rio would make this argument except in 
opposition to a non-dispositive motion for leave to amend. 
There were 27 plaintiffs in the Federal Litigation. However, most of them had 
claim against one well (26-1 A). This is evident from pg. 3 of the Proposed Settlement 
Asset Distribution, This is also evident from the following statement from pg. 3: "As 
previously mentioned, it appears that the leaseholders will consist mainly of Del Rio 
Drilling Programs and Gerald Nielson." Nielson was the attorney who represented the 
plaintiffs in the Federal Litigation. Nielson has a 25% contingency in the leases. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Court did not enter a "final" judgment. It entered a judgment that was 
"certified" as final under URCP 54(b). This makes all the difference as seen in the case 
cited by Del-Rio. 
In Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976), plaintiffs case was dismissed in its 
entirety with no leave to amend. Plaintiff waited nine months following the order of 
dismissal before bringing a motion for leave to amend. 
The obvious difference between the two cases is the fact that the Court in this case 
granted plaintiffs leave to amend their Complaint. True, leave was only granted to amend 
the Complaint against Shaw, but that makes no difference since the basis for the decision 
mNichols was that the trial court was "without jurisdiction to entertain [the] motion [for 
leave],...." The trial court in this case reserved jurisdiction by granting leave for 
amendment of plaintiffs'Complaint against Shaw. 
In making its decision, the Court cited as authority 3 Moore's Federal Practice, 
Sec. 15.10 pp. 959-960. The Court characterized that provision as follows: "[T]here is an 
admonition that the careful practitioner will make sure that any order of dismissal contains 
a provision.for leave to amend, unless the court is not disposed to grant it. The author 
further suggests that to be on the safe side, the practitioner should make his motion not 
later than ten days (Rule 59(e), U.R.C.P.), after entry of the judgment of dismissal, where 
there is no provision therein giving leave to amend." 
In this case, plaintiffs Filed their Motion for Leave on November 12,2002. This 
was two days prior to entry of the Court's Order and Summary Judgment and nearly two 
weeks before it was required by the terms of the Order and Summary Judgment fl|2, pg. 5) 
Therefore, if need be, the Court can treat plaintiffs' Motion for Leave as a "motion to alter 
or amend the judgment" in accordance with URCP 59(e). In either case, plaintiffs' Motion 
is perfectly, legally justified. 
II. 
There is nothing wrong with the timeliness of the Motion. Even though the action 
has been pending since July, 2001, plaintiffs have explained why the Motion was 
necessitated by the Court's ruling on defendants5 Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Therefore, timeliness should be evaluated from the date of the Court's ruling, not from 
when the case was first filed. 
It is also significant to note that defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was 
not filed until August, 2002. There are reasons, good reasons, including substantive 
settlement discussions between the parties, why the case took-so long to get to this point. 
By Del-Rio's logic, its Motion for Summary Judgment was incredibly late (more than one 
year from the filing of the action). 
However, the better point is that it is not so "late" in the proceeding as Del-Rio 
makes it sound. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was filed at a time when the 
parties had conducted no discovery. Once again, plaintiffs would be happy to explain the 
reasons, but it is not like the parties have conducted all their discovery, and the case is 
ready to be tried. Discovery is going to start as soon as the pleadings are settled. 
Therefore, it is actually quite "early" in the proceeding. 
In plaintiffs' view, there are two claims that could have been brought against Del-
Rio. The first was under the 1995 Agreement. The second was under the joint venture 
partnership between Western, Syndicators and Del-Rio. However, both claims have a 
common genesis: the Proposed Settlement Asset Distribution. In other words, both claims 
are simply faces of the same coin that plaintiffs have been denied their proper interest in 
the distribution of the settlement proceeds from the Federal Litigation, which is how this 
dispute arose. 
Therefore, in terms of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs' new claim 
against Del-Rio" arose [in some measure] out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading,..." URCP 15(c) It is not like 
plaintiffs brought a claim against Del-Rio with absolutely no relation to the rest of the 
action. The two claims are intimately related, and it makes sense to have them heard in the 
same action. 
In fact, because of what is said above, it is possible that plaintiffs did not need to 
amend their Complaint in order to state their new "claim." However, given Del-Rio9s 
opposition to the Motion, justice was probably better served by plaintiffs making their 
intentions clear regarding the claims against Del-Rio. 
Del-Rio's prejudice argument has been met by what was stated above. If leave to 
amend is denied in this case, plaintiffs will simply file a separate action. To plaintiffs, it 
makes sense to keep the claim against Del-Rio in this case. Del-Rio never objected to its 
joinder in the first place.1 Plaintiffs have already demonstrated that if they are successful 
on appeal, Del-Rio will be back in the case anyway. Del-Rio has failed to demonstrate that 
leave to amend in this action will contribute to any prejudice they have identified. 
None of Del-Rio's cases support denial of plaintiffs' Motion in this case. Atcitty v. 
San Juan County School District, 967 P.2d 1261 (Utah App. 1998) is Del-Rio's leading 
1
 Del-Rio waited until now to raise a claim of "misjoinder." (Pg. 10, n.2) However, they filed no motion in 
this regard. In any event, the claims against Shaw and Del-Rio clearly have the 10 Federal oil and gas leases 
in common, which is more than enough to justify joinder even if the claims are not made "jointly, severally, 
or alternatively." 
case, but it is easy to see why it does not apply here. Plaintiff did not file his motion until 
two and a half months after the discovery cut-off, indicating that the parties had completed 
their discovery. Furthermore, plaintiff's motion attempted to insert completely "new 
issues" (though the Court of Appeals did not say what they were). The Court mentioned 
nothing about prejudice to the party resisting the motion. 
Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 768 (Utah App. 1998) presented the same 
problems. Plaintiffs waited until after the discovery cut-off before bringing their motion. 
The Court noted that this was "well after partial summary judgment was entered and 
discovery was completed.'1 In addition, plaintiffs sought to bring two new claims, but one 
of them was against a completely new party. The Court noted that "granting the 
amendment would delay a trial in a case that had already been pending for years because it 
would involve the Railroad as a new party." 
In Hill v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 829 P.2d 142 (Utah App. 1992), 
leave to amend was sought "on the eve of trial." Furthermore, amendment was sought six 
years into the litigation. By that time, summary judgment had already been granted once, 
the case was back from appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, and a second motion for 
summary judgment was pending before the trial court. Those are plainly not the 
circumstances here. 
III. 
The answer to Del-Rio's first contention is simple: ^23 of the First Amended 
Complaint alleges as follows: "Del-Rio and plaintiffs Western United Mines, Inc. and 
f% 
Syndicators, Inc. were 'joint venture partners' in the development of some or all of the 
property that was the subject of the Claims Court Litigation in which they were to equally 
share." We thought it was obvious, but plaintiffs Western and Syndicators seek a two-
third's share of Del-Rio's distribution from the Federal Litigation. It is hard to be more 
specific than that. 
Which also answers Del-Rio's contention about the joinder of additional parties. 
Western and Syndicators did not have a joint venture partnership with those other parties. 
Accordingly, they have no claim against those other parties. Plaintiffs' claim in this case 
will not affect the interests of those other parties. 
More to the point, we have already demonstrated that those other parties have claim 
in one well, not in the leases. As shown above, Del-Rio has stated that fc4the leaseholders 
will consist mainly of Del Rio Drilling Programs and Gerald Nielson." There is nothing 
wrong with the pleading of plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing, additional reasons, plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File First 
Amended Complaint should be GRANTED. 
DATED this of January ,2003. 
DALTON&KELLEY 
Bv V/VAJJLQIJQEUW 
Donald L. Dalfon 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
d^ 
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1999 UTApp 232 
AMERICAN ESTATE MANAGEMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation; and John Does I-X, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 980264-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 29, 1999. 
Deed grantee brought adverse posses-
sion claim against grantor, relating to park-
ing lot adjacent to the deeded apartment 
complex. The District Court, Salt Lake De-
partment, J. Dennis Frederick, J., granted 
summary judgment to grantor. Grantee ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held 
that the adverse possession claim was barred 
by claim preclusion, relating to grantee's pri-
or action against grantor for allegedly 
breaching business separation agreement. 
Affirmed. 
1. Judgment @»540 
Defining the scope of a claim or cause of 
action for purposes of claim preclusion is not 
an exact science and, in fact, is at times 
driven by the relative importance of the final-
ity of judgment. 
1. Although IID styled its motion as a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, it was properly treated as a 
motion for summary judgment by the trial court 
When title to real property is at issue, 
the need for finality by claim preclusion is at 
its apex. 
3. Judgment <s=>587 
Deed grantee's theory that grantee ac-
quired parking lot adjacent to apartment 
complex by adverse possession could and 
should have been raised by grantee in grant-
ee's prior action alleging that grantor's fail-
ure to include parking lot in deed to apart-
ment complex breached business separation 
agreement between grantor and grantee, as 
element for barring adverse possession claim 
under claim preclusion. 
4. Judgment @»569 
Trial court's summary judgment for 
deed grantor in grantee's earlier action alleg-
ing in part that grantor breached business 
separation agreement by failing to include 
parking lot adjacent to apartment complex in 
deed to apartment complex was a final judg-
ment on the merits, as element for barring 
grantee's subsequent adverse possession 
claim under claim preclusion. 
Ronald G. Russell, Parr Waddoups Brown 
Gee Loveless, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Merrill F. Nelson and David M. Wahlquist, 
Kirton & McConkie, Salt Lake City, for Ap-
pellees. 
Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and 
ORME. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
H 1 American Estate Management Corpo-
ration (AEM) appeals the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of Interna-
tional Investment and Development Corpora-
tion (IID), arguing the trial court incorrectly 
determined that AEM's adverse possession 
claim is barred by the claim preclusion 
branch of res judicata.1 AEM claims title by 
because IID supported its motion with sources 
outside the pleadings. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b); 
DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 
838 n. 3 (Utah 1996). 
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adverse possession to a parcel of land used as 
a parking lot adjacent to the Highland Ter-
race Apartment Complex. AEM acquired 
the apartment complex by warranty deed 
from IID in 1982 and claims the description 
of the parking lot parcel was inadvertently 
omitted from the deed. We conclude that 
the trial court's ruling was correct, and we 
affirm its judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
1f2 In 1982, business partners Po and 
Beatrice Chang and Tony and Sandra Lin 
agreed to disentangle some of their joint 
business enterprises and, to that end, execut-
ed a Separation Agreement. Prior to the 
separation, AEM and IID had been jointly 
owned by the Changs and the Lins. Pursuant 
to the agreement, the Changs became the 
exclusive owners of AEM and the Lins ac-
quired exclusive ownership of IID. 
If 3 The Separation Agreement further 
provided that AEM would receive IID's in-
terest in the Highland Terrace Apartment 
Complex. IID executed a special warranty 
deed conveying the apartment complex par-
cel to AEM, but the adjacent parking lot 
parcel was not described in the deed. Alleg-
edly unaware that the parking lot had not 
been deeded, AEM took possession of the 
complex and the parking lot parcel and be-
gan paying taxes on both. Later the same 
year, the parties executed a document enti-
tled "Satisfaction of Debt," agreeing that all 
debts owed by IID to AEM were satisfied 
unless specifically identified in other docu-
ments. 
114 Several years later, the parties' busi-
ness relationship deteriorated, and, in 1990, 
AEM filed a complaint against the Lins, own-
ers of IID, raising numerous allegations of 
wrongdoing. In 1995, AEM amended its 
complaint to name IID as a party and to add 
and amend claims. One of AEM's claims 
sought damages for breach of the 1982 Sepa-
ration Agreement and another requested 
specific performance thereof. AEM alleged 
in its complaint that IID had breached the 
Separation Agreement when it failed to deed 
certain property to AEM. Answers to inter-
2. Because our ruling on the claim preclusion 
issue is dispositive, we have no occasion to ad-
rogatories referred to the parking lot parcel 
as one of the properties AEM alleged should 
have been deeded. The trial court ultimately 
granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Lins and IID on all claims related to the 
Separation Agreement, ruling that the 1982 
Satisfaction of Debt "specifically disposed of 
claims arising from the Separation Agree-
ment." 
U 5 In 1997, AEM instituted this second 
action against IID claiming ownership of the 
parking lot parcel by adverse possession. 
The trial court granted summary judgment 
to IID, concluding that AEM's adverse pos-
session claim was precluded by the trial 
court's judgment in the earlier action. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
116 AEM argues on appeal that claim 
preclusion does not bar its adverse posses-
sion claim because (1) the breach of contract 
claim in the prior action arose out of a differ-
ent, earlier transaction or occurrence than 
the adverse possession claim in the pending 
action and (2) the breach of contract action 
did not result in a final judgment on the 
merits.2 We review the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment for correctness, deter-
mining whether the court correctly concluded 
that no genuine issue of material fact existed 
and whether the court correctly applied the 
governing law. See Harline v. Barker, 912 
P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996). 
ANALYSIS 
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action 
only if the suit in which that cause of 
action is being asserted and the prior suit 
satisfy three requirements. First, both 
cases must involve the same parties or 
their privies. Second, the claim that is 
alleged to be barred must have been pre-
sented in the first suit or must be one that 
could and should have been raised in the 
first action. Third, the first suit must have 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Madsen v, Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 
1988). Accord Estate of Covington v. Jo-
dress the parties' alternative arguments concern-
ing issue preclusion. 
AM. ESTATE MGT. v. INTERN. INV. & DEV. Utah 767 
Cite as 986 P.2d 765 (UtahApp. 1999) 
888 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah CtApp. when it filed its complaint in the prior action 
that title to the parking lot parcel remained 
with IID and because AEM had no duty to 
amend its complaint to add the adverse pos-
session claim. 
sephson, 
1994), cert, denied, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). 
If these three requirements are met, "the 
result in the prior action constitutes the full 
relief available to the parties on the same 
claim or cause of action." Ringwood v. For-
eign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 
(Utah CtApp.), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 
(Utah 1990). Claim preclusion serves "vital 
public interests!,] includ[ing] (1) fostering re-
liance on prior adjudications; (2) preventing 
inconsistent decisions; (3) relieving parties of 
the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits; 
and (4) conserving judicial resources." Office 
of Recovery Servs. v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944, 
946 (Utah Ct.App.1992). 
H 7 AEM does not dispute that it brought 
both suits against the same parties, the Lins, 
and their privy, IID. Nevertheless, it argues 
its adverse possession claim is not barred 
because the second and third requirements 
of claim preclusion are not met. Specifically, 
AEM argues its adverse possession claim 
was not brought in the prior action, nor could 
or should it have been, and that the first 
action did not result in a final judgment on 
the merits. 
A. Adverse Possession Could and 
Should Have Been Raised 
118 AEM's adverse possession claim is 
barred by the judgment in the prior action if 
both suits raised the same claim or cause of 
action, or if AEM could and should have 
raised its adverse possession claim in the 
prior action. See Madsen, 769 P.2d at 247. 
While AEM concedes that its entitlement to 
the parking lot parcel was at issue in both 
actions, it argues its prior claim to title based 
on the Separation Agreement did not raise 
the same claim or cause of action raised in 
the present action, i.e., to quiet title to the 
parking lot parcel on the ground of adverse 
possession. AEM asserts that the adverse 
possession claim did not arise out of the 
Separation Agreement, the transaction out of 
which the prior breach of contract claim 
arose, and that proof of the adverse posses-
sion claim requires presentation of different 
facts and evidence. Further, AEM argues 
its adverse possession claim was not one that 
could and should have been brought in the 
prior action because AEM was unaware 
119 The Utah Supreme Court has defined 
claim or cause of action as 
"the aggregate of operative facts which 
give rise to a right enforceable in the 
courts." A claim is the "situation or state 
of facts which entitles a party to sustain an 
action and gives him the right to seek 
judicial interference in his behalf." A 
claim petitions the court to award a reme-
dy for injury suffered by the plaintiff. A 
cause of action is necessarily comprised of 
specific elements which must be proven 
before relief is granted. A claim or cause 
of action is resolved by a judicial pro-
nouncement providing or denying the re-
quested remedy. 
Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc., 766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1988) (cita-
tions omitted). 
[1,2] U10 Defining the scope of a claim 
or cause of action is not an exact science and, 
in fact, is at times driven by the relative 
importance of the finality of judgment. 
Compare In re J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 163-64 
(Utah Ct.App.1994) ("[I]t cannot be persua-
sively argued that judicial economy or the 
convenience afforded by finality of legal con-
troversies must override the concern for a 
child's welfare.") with Office of Recovery 
Servs., 845 P.2d at 947 ("[Policies advanced 
by the doctrine of res judicata have particu-
lar importance in this case because the 
child's right not to be bastardized far out-
weighs defendant's interest in asserting non-
paternity more than six years after having 
acknowledged paternity."). When, as in this 
case, title to real property is at issue, the 
need for finality is at its apex. See Farrell v. 
Brown, 111 Idaho 1027, 729 P.2d 1090, 1093 
(Ct.App.1986); 18 Charles Alan Wright, et 
al, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4408, 
at 65 (1981). 
1111 Contrary to AEM's characterization, 
both its prior and present actions assert one 
claim—a claim of title to the parking lot 
parcel—albeit under two different legal theo-
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ries. Other jurisdictions have so ruled, and 
have held subsequent suits barred. See, e.g., 
Bhnce v. Alley, 697 A.2d 828, 830-31 (Me. 
1997) (holding claim of adverse possession 
barred by judgments in two prior actions to 
establish title to same property via other 
legal theories); Hyman v. Hillelson, 79 
A.D.2d 725, 434 N.Y.S.2d 742, 745 (N.Y.App. 
Div.1980) (ruling subsequent adverse posses-
sion action and prior suit for reformation of 
deed not separate and distinct where both 
involved dispute over conveyance of adjoining 
lots), ajfd, 55 N.Y.2d 624, 446 N.Y.S.2d 251, 
430 N.E.2d 1304 (1981); Myers v. Thomas, 
No. 01A01-9111-CH-00412, 1992 WL 56993, 
at *4, 1992 Tenn.App. LEXIS 260, at *9-10 
(Tenn.Ct.App. Mar. 25, 1992) (holding addi-
tion of adverse possession claim insufficient 
to distinguish later suit from prior suit in-
volving same property); Green v. Parrack, 
974 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tex.CtApp.1998) (hold-
ing prior judgment establishing ownership to 
strip of land precluded subsequent competing 
claims to same strip by same parties under 
different legal theories). 
[3] f 12 Nevertheless, we need not de-
finitively determine whether AEM has raised 
one claim or two because we readily conclude 
that AEM could and should have brought its 
adverse possession claim in the prior suit. 
Claim preclusion "'reflects the expectation 
that parties who are given the capacity to 
present their "entire controversies" shall in 
fact do so.'" Ringwood, 786 P.2d at 1357 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
§ 24 cmt. a (1982)). If a party fails, purpose-
ly or negligently, to " 'make good his cause of 
action . . . "by all proper means within his 
control, . . . he will not afterward be permit-
ted to deny the correctness of that determi-
nation, nor to relitigate the same matters 
between the same parties.""' Horner v. 
Whitta, No. 13-93-33, 1994 WL 114881, at 
*2, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1248, at *6-7 
(Ohio CtApp, Mar. 16, 1994) (citations omit-
ted in original), appeal denied, 70 Ohio St.3d 
1416, 637 N.E.2d 12 (1994). 
113 In Ringwood v. Foreign Auto 
Works, Inc., Ringwood filed two separate 
complaints against individuals to whom he 
had sold stock in Foreign Auto Works, Inc. 
See 786 P.2d at 1352-53. Ringwood's first 
suit was dismissed because it was based on a 
promissory note the trial court found had 
merged into a later agreement. See id. at 
1357-58. Ringwood then brought suit for 
breach of the later agreement See id. at 
1353. This court reversed the trial court's 
ruling that Ringwood's second action was not 
barred by res judicata, concluding that any 
"claim by Ringwood under the November 
agreement could have been decided in the 
prior action, as the agreement was extant 
and was in default. The only reason it was 
not decided was because Ringwood failed to 
raise the claim Therefore, we find that 
res judicata bars Ringwood's claims[.]" Id. 
% 14 AEM's situation is similar. When it 
filed its complaint in the prior action in 1990, 
it had possessed the parking lot parcel for 
the requisite seven years. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-12 (1996). Hence, its adverse 
possession claim was then ripe. AEM had a 
second chance to raise a claim of adverse 
possession when it amended its complaint in 
1995, but did not. As in Ringwood, the only 
reason AEM's claim of adverse possession 
was not decided in the prior action is because 
AEM failed to raise it And, as in Ring-
wood, the claim preclusion branch of res 
judicata bars AEM from doing so now. See 
Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 45, 47, 376 
P.2d 946, 947-48 (1962) ("Here, we have the 
same parties litigating the same subject mat-
ter—an asserted right of way over defen-
dants' property.... [T]he issue or theory of 
implied easement, now urged in this second 
action, could have been urged and adjudicat-
ed in the first action."). Accord Irving Pulp 
& Paper Ltd. v. Kelly, 654 A.2d 416, 418 
(Me. 1995) (Adverse possession was "an issue 
that might have been tried in the 1951 action. 
Under the doctrine of res judicata, [appellee] 
and his privies are therefore precluded from 
having or claiming any right or title adverse 
to [appellant] for any period prior to Novem-
ber 1951."); Bagley v. Moxley, 407 Mass. 
633, 555 N.E.2d 229, 232 (1990) ("[P]laintiffs 
were not entitled to pursue their claim of 
ownership through piecemeal litigation, offer-
ing one legal theory to the court while hold-
ing others in reserve for future litigation 
AM. ESTATE MGT. v. INTERN. INV. & DEV. Utah 769 
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should the first prove unsuccessful.").3 
B. The Prior Action Resulted In a 
Final Judgment on the Merits 
[4] 115 Having determined that AEM 
could and should have raised its adverse 
possession claim in the prior action, we now 
consider AEM's argument that res judicata 
does not bar its current suit for title to the 
parking lot parcel by adverse possession be-
cause the prior action did not result in a final 
judgment on the merits.4 We also reject this 
argument. 
1116 First, the trial court's Memorandum 
Decision unequivocally granted summary 
judgment to the defendants on AEM's claims 
of breach of the 1982 Separation Agreement. 
AEM's fifth claim for relief in its amended 
complaint alleged, at paragraph 44(g), that 
"[t]he Lins have breached the March 1982 
Separation Agreement . . . [b]y failing to 
deed certain properties to Plaintiffs as con-
templated by the agreement." In an inter-
rogatory, AEM was asked to "[p]rovide the 
legal description of all properties you refer-
ence in paragraph 44(g)." AEM responded: 
"The legal description of these properties will 
be produced in connection with the produc-
tion of documents, but includes a one-foot 
strip along the boundary of the Draper prop-
erty and a parcel of property associated with 
the Highland Terrace Apartments." The tri-
3. Many other courts have come to the same 
conclusion when a second action alleging ad-
verse possession has been brought by the party 
who failed to prove its entitlement to real proper-
ty in a prior action premised on some other 
theory. See, e.g., West Mich. Park Ass'n v. Fogg, 
158 Mich.App. 160, 404 N.W.2d 644, 648 (1987) 
("While it is true that the plaintiffs did not claim 
the property by adverse possession in [the prior 
action], that claim could have been made in [the 
prior action]. It is therefore barred[.]"), appeal 
denied, No. 80701 (Mich. Aug. 28, 1987); Hang-
man v. Bruening, 247 Neb. 769, 530 N.W.2d 247, 
249 (1995) ("The theory of adverse possession 
could have been raised in the earlier quiet title 
litigation. All matters which could have been 
litigated in the earlier proceedings are barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata."); Hyman, 434 
N.Y.S.2d at 745 ("At the time the first action for 
reformation was commenced, the cause of action 
for adverse possession was also viable and could 
also have been pleaded in the prior complaint 
and determined in the prior action."). 
al court's Memorandum Decision, specifically 
incorporated into its Final Order, stated: 
Defendants claim that they are entitled to 
dismissal of claim 5 (Breach of Separation 
Agreement) under a theory of accord, sat-
isfaction, and release. They contend that 
any problems regarding the separation 
agreement were worked out by the parties 
when they signed a March 1, 1982 "Satis-
faction of Debt." . . . Defendants!'] argu-
ment appears to be well taken. The re-
lease specifically disposed of claims arising 
from the Separation Agreement. Thus the 
Court concludes that the "Satisfaction of 
Debt" releases this claim and defendants' 
motion [for summary judgment] is granted 
as to this claim. 
Summary judgment on the Separation 
Agreement claims constituted a judgment on 
the merits which became final upon entry of 
the Final Order.5 
II17 Moreover, AEM's claims for breach 
of the Separation Agreement were not 
among those claims voluntarily dismissed by 
stipulation, as AEM argues. The trial 
court's Final Order indicates specifically 
which claims were dismissed by stipulation. 
Claims relating to the Separation Agreement 
were not among them. Thus, dismissal of 
the breach of Separation Agreement claims 
was not a voluntary dismissal without preju-
dice. See Utah R. Civ. P. 41. The third 
requirement of claim preclusion, that the pri-
4. It is inarguable that a final judgment was en-
tered in the prior action. AEM's contention in 
this appeal is really that that judgment did not 
encompass various claims in issue between the 
parties, including ownership of the parking lot 
parcel. 
5. Because the trial court specifically addressed 
the breach of Separation Agreement claims and 
granted summary judgment thereon in favor of 
the defendants, those claims are not implicated 
by the trial court's statement in the Final Order 
that "[a]ll claims of the parties set forth in their 
pleadings not reduced to summary judgment 
herein or otherwise dealt with by this Order are 
hereby dismissed." We therefore have no occa-
sion to consider AEM's argument that the trial 
court's language concerning these stray claims 
effected a dismissal without prejudice under Rule 
41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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or action must have resulted in a final judg-
ment on the merits, is therefore met. 
CONCLUSION 
II18 AEM's claim of title to the parking 
lot parcel is barred under the claim preclu-
sion branch of res judicata. AEM could and 
should have raised its adverse possession 
claim in the prior action alleging breach of 
the 1982 Separation Agreement. Further, 
the prior action resulted in a final judgment 
on the merits. Accordingly, the trial court 
correctly granted IID's motion for summary 
judgment on res judicata grounds. 
119 Affirmed. 
H 20 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. 
BENCH, Judge, and JAMES Z. DAVIS, 
Judge. 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHRISTY OAKS, 
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vs. 
JAMES CONNELLEY; and 
LORI ANN ATCHLEY, 
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JAMES CONNELLEY and 
LORI ANN ATCHLEY, 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CHRISTY OAKS, 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF JAMES CONNELLEY AND 
LORI ANN ATCHLEY'S 
MOTION FOR PREJUDGMENT 
WRIT OF REPLEVIN 
Civil No. 050907655 
Judge L. A. Dever 
James Connelley and Lori Ann Atchley, by and through their counsel, and pursuant to 
Rules 64, 64A and 64B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully submit this 
Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Replevin against Plaintiff and 
Counterclaim Defendant Christy Oaks. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Background 
1. Danny G. Connelley ("Danny"), husband of Ms. Oaks and father of Mr. 
Connelley and Ms. Atchley, died on November 10, 2004. 
2. Ms. Oaks had herself appointed as personal representative of Danny's Estate 
("Personal Representative"). 
3. On March 22, 2005, Plaintiff, Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley each signed an 
Agreement Among Heirs, the purpose of which was to "resolve [the] disputes regarding the 
administration of the Estate [of Danny] and also to settle [the] rights, claims and interest in the 
Estate of Danny." (See Agreement Among Heirs ("Agreement") attached hereto as Ex. , 
Recital C.) 
4. Pursuant to the Agreement, Ms. Oaks was to receive $50,000.00 from the Estate 
or from Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley in satisfaction of her claims and rights as surviving 
spouse or creditor of Danny. 
5. However, subsequent to signing the Agreement Among Heirs Mr. Connelley and 
Ms. Atchley became aware that in negotiating the Agreement that Ms. Oaks had made material 
misrepresentations regarding the Estate and her wrongful actions while she was Personal 
Representative, and that Ms. Oaks breached her fiduciary duties as Personal Representative. 
6. When Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley became aware of Ms. Oaks' wrongful acts 
as Personal Representative, they offered her $37,500.00 to settle the dispute between them. 
However, in an April 19, 2005, letter, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit , Craig J. 
Wangsgard ("Mr. Wangsgard"), Ms. Oaks' counsel, stated that she was "unwilling to accept a 
lesser amount than the $50,000 agreed to in the Agreement Among Heirs." Ms. Oaks' counsel 
stated that Ms. Oaks planned on filing litigation if she did not receive the entire $50,000 by April 
21,2005. (See Ex. .) 
7. On about April 23, 2005, Ms. Atchley dropped off a $40,000.00 cashier's check 
to Ms. Oaks ("Cashier's Check"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit , which 
contained a clear statement that it was tendered as full satisfaction of all claims. (See Ex. .) 
8. In an April 25, 2005, letter, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit , Mr. 
Wangsgard stated that the Agreement called for a payment of $50,000.00, and that he would file 
litigation if the entire $50,000.00 was not paid by April 27, 2005. 
9. On April 26, 2005, Ms. Oaks filed suit against Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley. 
In the suit, Ms. Oaks alleged that Defendants had failed to pay $50,000.00 due her under the 
Agreement and requested a judgment for the entire $50,000.00. (See Complaint filed herein at f 
16, and Prayer for Relief at f2.) 
10. On May 20, 2005, Defendants filed an Answer and Counterclaim alleging that the 
Agreement is void, inter alia, because of Plaintiff s fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations 
regarding Ms. Oaks' wrongful acts as Personal Representative and the status of the Estate's 
assets. Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley also seek damages from Plaintiff due to her breach of 
fiduciary duties while she was Personal Representative. (See Answer and Counterclaim, filed 
herein.) 
11. On Friday, May 20, 2005, despite having previously rejected the Settlement Offer 
and despite alleging that Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley owed her $50,000.00 pursuant to the 
Agreement in her Complaint, Ms. Oaks' wrongfully cashed the $40,000.00 cashier's check that 
Mr. Connelley and Ms. Oaks had tendered as part of the Settlement Offer. (See May 26, 2005, 
letter from Nathan Wilcox to Craig Wangsgard, Ex. ; Cashier's Check, Ex. .) 
12. On May 23, 2005, after Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley filed a motion herein to 
disqualify Mr. Wangsgard as counsel for Ms. Oaks in this matter, Mr. Wangsgard wrote a letter, 
a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit , to Nathan B. Wilcox ("Mr. Wilcox") of 
Anderson & Karrenberg, counsel for Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley, offering to dismiss Ms. 
Oaks' Complaint for the "$40,000 already presented to her, and an assignment of any interest of 
any interest that James Connelley, Lori Atchley and the Estate of Danny G. Connelley may have 
in the wrongful death of Danny G. Connelley." (See Ex. .) Mr. Wangsgard did not mention 
that his client had already cashed the check. (See Ex. .) 
13. In a May 26, 2005, letter, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit , Mr. 
Wilcox demanded that if Ms. Oaks return the $40,000.00 proceeds from the Cashier's Check by 
Wednesday, May 25, 2005, or Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley would be forced to file this 
Motion with the Court. (See Ex. .) 
14. Ms. Oaks has failed to return the $40,000.00 to Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley. 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Rules 64,64A and 64B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley Are Entitled To a Prejudgment Writ of Replevin 
Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley respectfully request that the Court enter a prejudgment 
writ of replevin against Christy Oaks, requiring Ms. Oaks to return Mr. Connelley's and Ms. 
Atchley's $40,000.00 or to deposit that sum into the Court. 
A writ of replevin is available "to compel delivery to the plaintiff of specific personal 
property held by the defendant." Utah R. Civ. P. 64B(a). Pursuant to Rules 64A and 64B, the 
Court may issue a prejudgment writ of replevin against Ms. Oaks if Mr. Connelley and Ms. 
Atchley show: (1) that the $40,000.00 that Ms. Oaks wrongfully took is not earnings and not 
exempt from execution; (2) that the writ is not sought to hinder, delay or defraud Ms. Oaks; (3) 
there is a substantial likelihood that Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley will prevail on the merits of 
their underlying claims; (4) that Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley have an ownership or special 
interest in the $40,000; and (5) that Ms. Oaks is wrongfully detaining Mr. Connelley and Ms. 
Atchley's $40,000.00. Utah R. Civ. P. 64A(c)(l)-(3), (5); 64B(b)(l)-(2). Mr. Connelley and Ms. 
Atchley easily meet all of the requirements. 
A. Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley's $40,000.00 Is Not Ms. Oaks' and Is Not 
Exempt From Execution. 
First, as is clear from the April 25, 2005, letter from Ms. Oak's counsel, the $40,000.00 
Cashier's Check does not represent the earnings of Ms. Oaks. Instead, this amount was part of 
the Settlement Offer, which Ms. Oaks chose not to accept. Ms. Oaks never accepted. Rather 
than return the Cashier's Check, Ms. Oaks simply cashed it and took Mr. Connelley and Ms. 
Atchley's $40,000.00 in complete disregard of their rights and the terms of the Settlement Offer. 
Furthermore, the $40,000.00 is not exempt from execution through a writ of replevin. 
B. Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley Do Not Seek a Prejudgment Writ of 
Replevin to Hinder, Delay or Defraud Ms. Oaks. 
Second, the prejudgment writ of replevin is not sought to hinder, delay or defraud Ms. 
Oaks. Obviously the $40,000.00 belongs to Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley. Ms. Oaks did not 
accept the Settlement Offer, and Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley merely seek to recover the 
$40,000.00, to which Ms. Oaks has no claim. 
C. Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley are Substantially Likely to Prevail on 
Their Underlying Claims Against Ms. Oaks. 
Third, there is a substantial likelihood that Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley will prevail 
both on the merits of their defenses against Ms. Oaks' claims against them, as well as on their 
own breach of fiduciary claims against Ms. Oaks. As outlined in both Mr. Connelley and Ms. 
Atchley's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disqualify Counsel and Answer and 
Counterclaim, both of which are hereby incorporated by reference, Ms. Oaks utterly failed to 
properly perform her duties as Personal Representative. Indeed, Ms. Oaks only became Personal 
Representative by misrepresenting her priority to be such to the Court presiding over the Estate. 
Ms. Oaks made other material misrepresentations regarding the profitability of the 
Estate's major asset, A-l Appliance, Inc., and that she and the counsel for the Estate that she 
retained acted in the best interests of the Estate, rather than solely for her personal interests. Mr. 
Connelley and Ms. Atchley did not know of, and had no reason to know of, Ms. Oaks' wrongful 
acts when they signed the Agreement. Ms. Oaks' actions made it highly likely that the 
Agreement will be avoided and that Ms. Oaks will be liable in damages to Mr. Connelley and 
Ms. Atchley. 
D. Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley Are Entitled to Their $40,000.00 that Ms. 
Oaks Is Wrongfully Detaining. 
Fourth, there can be no question that Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley are entitled to the 
return of their $40,000.00. Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley tendered the Cashier's Check on the 
condition that Ms. Oaks accept the Settlement Offer. However, Ms. Oaks took the check, 
rejected the Settlement Offer, initiated this suit for the entire $50,000.00 she purports that Mr 
Connelley and Ms. Atchley owe her, and then cashed the cashier Js check anyway! Ms. Oaks is 
wrongfully detaining the $40,000.00, entitling Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley to a writ of 
replevin. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley have clearly met the requirements for a prejudgment writ 
of replevin against Ms. Oaks, requiring Ms. Oaks to return the $40,000.00 to Mr. Connelley and 
Ms. Atchley or deposit it with the Court. Accordingly, Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley request 
that the Court grant their Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Replevin, and enter the proposed 
Order submitted concurrently herewith, authorizing the issuance of a Prejudgment Writ of 
Replevin. 
DATED: June 1,2005. 
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Attorneys for James Connelley and 
Lori Ann Atchley 
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